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Artists have been deluding themselves, for centuries, with the no-
tion that they create. In fact they do nothing of the sort.
Spider Robinson'
Our copyright law is based on the charming notion that authors create
something from nothing, that works owe their origin2 to the authors who
produce them.' Arguments for strengthening copyright protection,
whether predicated on a theory of moral deserts4 or expressed in terms of
* Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University. The author would like to thank
Jonathan Weinberg, Martin Adelman, Jane Ginsburg, Ralph Brown, Wendy Gordon, Fred Yen, and
Harry Litman, as well as her former colleagues - too numerous to list individually - at the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School, for their extensive and valuable comments on earlier drafts of this
article.
S. ROBINSON, Melancholy Elephants, in MELANCHOLY ELEPHANTS 1, 16 (1985).
See I M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[A], at 2-8.1 (1989).
3 See id. § 1.06[A).
" See, e.g., Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency,
Consent and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1343, 1442-65 (1989); Ladd, The Harm of
the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 421 (1983).
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economic incentives,5 often begin with the premise that copyright should
adjust the balance between the creative individuals who bring new works
into being and the greedy public who would steal the fruits of their
genius.6
The process of authorship, however, is more equivocal than that ro-
mantic model admits. To say that every new work is in some sense based
on the works that preceded it' is such a truism that it has long been a
cliche, invoked but not examined. But the very act of authorship* in any
medium is more akin to translation and recombination than it is to creat-
ing Aphrodite from the foam of the sea. Composers .recombine sounds they
have heard before;8 playwrights base their characters on bits and pieces
drawn from real human beings and other playwrights' characters;9 novel-
ists draw their plots from lives and other plots within their experience; 0
software writers use the logic they find in other software;, lawyers trans-
" See, e.g., Comment, A Rose By Any Other Name: Computer Programs and the Idea-Expres-
sion Distinction, 34 EMORY L.J. 741 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, A Rose]; Comment, Copyright
Protection for Citations to a Law Reporter: West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 71
MINN. L. REV. 991 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Copyright Protection].
6 See, e.g., Burcart, No Title to Titles: An Analysis of the Lack of Copyright Protection for
Literary Titles, 32 COPYRIGHT L. Symp. (ASCAP) 75, 102 (1986); Hill, Copyright Protection for
Historical Research: A Defense of the Minority View, 31 COPYRIGHT L. SyMP. (ASCAP) 45, 60-61
(1984); Kernochan, Imperativesfor Enforcing Authors' Rights, 11 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 587
(1987).
See, e.g., Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S.A. 209, 218 (1983); Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325, 332 (1989); Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1981, at 147, ,171-73.
8 E.g., L. KLEIN & J. MITCHELL, The Beat of Black Wings, on CHALK MARK IN A RAIN-
STORM, side 2, track 2 (Geffen Records, 1988); see, e.g., Propper, American "Popular" Music and
the Copyright Law, 3 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 165, 180-83 (1940); Ressner, New Faces: Syd
Straw, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 21, 1989, at 25, col. 2; Rockwell, From Bits of Jack Benny, a Quasi
Opera, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1989, at 11, col. 1; Pareles, In Pop, Whose Song Is It, Anyway?, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 27, 1989, § 2 (Arts & Leisure), at 1, col. 1.
See, e.g., D. HWANG, M. BtrIERFLY 4 (1988); C. ZADAN, SONDHEIM & Co. 243-51 (2d ed.
1989).
's See, e.g., Yellin, A Method That Works (For Me), THE WRITER, Oct. 1989, at 18, 19-20;
Lew, Hemingway Typescripts and Letters Are Found, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1989, at C21, col. 1;
James, The Ayatollah's Other Victim, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1989, at C17, col. 4 (interview with
Marianne Wiggins).
" See, e.g., Machrone, Roots: The Evolution of Innovation, PC MAG., May 26, 1987, at 166;
Samuelson, Is Copyright Law Steering the Right Course?, IEEE SOFTWARE, Sept. 1988, at 78;
Fisher, Software Industry in Uproar Over Recent Rush of Patents, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1989, at
Al, col. 5.
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form old arguments to fit new facts; cinematographers, actors, choreogra-
phers, architects, and sculptors all engage in the process of adapting,
transforming, and recombining what is already "out there" in some other
form.12 This is not parasitism: it is the essence of authorship. And, in the
absence of a vigorous public domain, much of it would be illegal.
Because copyright's paradigm of authorship credits the author with
bringing something wholly new into the world, it sometimes fails to ac-
count for the raw material that all authors use. This tendency can distort
our understanding of the interaction between copyright law and author-
ship. Specifically, it can lead us to give short shrift to the public domain
by failing to appreciate that the public domain is the law's primary safe-
guard of the raw material that makes authorship possible.
Commentary on thepublic domain has tended to portray it either as the
public's toll for conferring private property rights in works of author-
ship"3 or as the realm of material undeserving of property rights. 4 The
current trend is to characterize material in the public domain as unpro-
tectible or uncopyrightable. 5 This description has important implications,
for it inspires the question "Why not?" Proponents of strong copyright
protection have challenged the rationales for refusing copyright protection
to authors' creations and have called for property rights to be given in
material as yet unprotected by copyright law. 6
1" See, e.g., S. L-E, SPIKE LEE'S GOTTA HAVE IT: INSIDE GUERRILLA FILMMAKING 76-100
(1987); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT IN WORKS OF ARCHITECTURE 195-96 (1989);
Marion, Three Men and a Pop Star, TV GUIDE, Aug. 4-10, 1990, at 14, 15; Russell, Conjured by
Calder, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1989, § 2 (Arts & Leisure), at 1, col. 1; Brown, A City Built for Rock
'n' Roll, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1989, at C1, col. 4; Batman's Birth Came in 1939, Det. Free Press,
June 22, 1989, at 4B, col. 1; Anderson, Critic's Notebook. Dance and the Influence of Others, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 18, 1989, at C15, col. 4; Irwin, How a Classic Clown Keeps Inspiring Comedy, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 9, 1989, § 2 (Arts & Leisure), at 1, col. 2.
" See, e.g., Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 BULL. COPYRIGHT
SOC'Y U.S.A. 560, 560-61 (1982); Krasilovsky, Observations on Public Domain, 14 BULL. COPY-
RIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 205, 210-18 (1967); Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 7 (1987).
" See, e.g., B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 45-46 (1967); 1 M. NIMMER &
D. NIMMER, supra note 2, §§ 2.01[B], 2.03; Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory
for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 521-22 (1981); Goldstein,
supra note 7, at 222.
" See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Fleischmann, The Inpact of Digital Technology on Copyright Law, 70 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 5 (1988); Comment, A Rose, supra note 5, at 769-76.
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To characterize the public domain as a quid pro quo for copyright or as
the sphere of insignificant contributions, however, is to neglect its central
importance in promoting the enterprise of authorship. The public domain
should be understood not as the realm of material that is undeserving of
protection, but as a device that permits the rest of the system to work by
leaving the raw material of authorship available for authors to use.
This article examines the public domain by looking at the gulf between
what authors really do and the way the law perceives them. Part I out-
lines the basics of copyright as a species of property and introduces the
public domain's place within the copyright scheme. Copyright grants au-
thors" ' rights modeled on real property in order to encourage authorship
by providing authors with markets in which they can seek compensation
for their creations. Because parcels of authorship are intangible, however,
the law faces *problems in determining the ownership and boundaries of
its property grants. In particular, the concept of "originality," by refer-
ence to which copyright law purports to define property rights, provides
an insufficient guide. The public domain - a commons that includes
those aspects of copyrighted works which copyright does not protect -
makes it possible to tolerate the imprecision of these property grants.
Part II of this article traces the historical developmenf of the public
domain in copyright case law. Courts have gradually come to deny copy-
right protection to ideas, methods, systems, plots, sc~nes b faire,18 and
(sometimes) facts, even when blatantly copied from plaintiffs' works. The
courts have not sought profound theoretical justifications for denying pro-
tection, and different classes of cases reveal different motivations. Courts
have seemed to invoke the public domain, however, in cases where the
breadth of plaintiffs' asserted property rights appeared to threaten the en-
terprise of authorship by curtailing the ability of authors to pursue their
craft.
Part III explores familiar theoretical justifications for the public do-
main and finds them for the most part unsatisfactory. Therefore, Part IV
" Throughout this article, I use the terms "author" and "authorship" in their copyright sense,
see 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 201 (1988), rather than in the vernacular sense of a person who writes or
the process of writing. Thus, I refer to the person responsible for the creation of any copyrightable
work as its author. See 17 U.S.C. § 201.
" "Scenes a faire" is a term used to describe stock scenes, cliches, and common expressive de-
tails. See infra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 39
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returns to the principle of copyright as property. This section argues that
originality is a legal fiction. It is inherently unascertainable, and it is not
the battleground on which infringement suits are in fact decided. Because
authors necessarily reshape the prior works of others, a vision of author-
ship as original creation from nothing - and of authors as casting up
truly new creations from their innermost being - is both flawed and mis-
leading. If we took this vision seriously, we could not grant authors copy-
rights without first dissecting their creative processes to pare elements
adapted from the works of others from the later authors' recasting of
them. This dissection would be both impossible and unwelcome. If we
eschewed this vision but nonetheless adhered unswervingly to the concept
of originality, we would have to allow the author of almost any work to be
enjoined by the owner of the copyright in another.
Part V of this article suggests that the public domain provides the solu-
tion to this dilemma and examines that solution from the perspectives of
potential defendants, potential plaintiffs, and the system of copyright law
as a whole. The public domain contains elements of authorship that easily
seep into our minds and our language or that for other reasons can be
claimed by many authors. A broad public domain protects potential de-
fendants from incurring liability through otherwise unavoidable copying.
It protects would-be plaintiffs by relieving them of the impossible and
unwelcome obligation to prove the actual originality of all elements of
their works. It protects the copyright system by freeing it from the burden
of deciding questions of ownership that it has no capacity to answer.
The purpose of copyright law is to encourage authorship. When we
embody that encouragement in property rights for authors, we can lose
sight of a crucial distinction: Nurturing authorship is not necessarily the
same thing as nurturing authors. When individual authors claim that they
are entitled to incentives that would impoverish the milieu in which other
authors must also work, we must guard against protecting authors at the
expense of the enterprise of authorship.
1990]
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I. COPYRIGHT AND PROPERTY
Copyright law is a legal scheme, prescribed in the Constitution19 and
put in place by Congress,2 ° to encourage the enterprise of authorship.21 In
the 280 years since the enactment of the first copyright statute,22 the tech-
nicalities surrounding copyright have assumed diverse forms,2" but the es-
sential nWchanism has remained constant: The system creates legal rights
akin to property rights.24
According to a currently popular mode of analysis, property rights in
intellectual works are necessary because intellectual creations pose a pub-
lic goods problem: The cost of creating the works is often high, the cost of
reproducing them is low, and once created, the works may be reproduced
rapaciously without depleting the original.25 In a world in which such
reproduction is not restrained, an author will be unable to recover the
costs of creating a work and will therefore forgo the creative endeavor in
favor of something more remunerative. 2' To provide the author with a
market in which she can. seek compensation for her creation, we establish
property rights in her work and allow her to sell or lease these rights to
others. Thus, the copyright system encourages authors to create and en-
courages distributors to purchase rights in authors' creations so that the
distributors may sell those creations to the rest of us.
' See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
20 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988).
21 Commentators have described the purpose of copyright in various ways, such as providing an
incentive for authors to create by securing remuneration for their work, see Gordon, Fair Use as
Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982), encouraging the dissemination of knowledge and its addition to the
public domain, see Gorman, supra note 13, at 560; see also 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra
note 2, § 1.03[A], at 1-32, and attracting private investment to the production of original expression,
see Goldstein, supra note 7. The common ground among opposing camps of commentators is that
copyright seeks either directly or indirectly to encourage authorship.
2 Great Britain enacted the world's first copyright law in 1710. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne
19. See generally A. LATMAN, R. GORMAN & J. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 1-4
(1989); L. PATrERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 143-79 (1968).
25 See generally A. LATMAN, R. GORMAN & J. GINSBURG, supra note 22, at 3-12, 30-40.
24 See, e.g., 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.03[A], at 1-32 to -33; Gordon,
supra note 21, at 1604.
"' See, e.g., Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1700-05
(1988); Gordon, supra note 21, at 1610-13; Landes & Posner, supra note 7, at 326.
26 See, e.g., Brennan, -Harper & Row v. The Nation, Inc.: Copyrightability and Fair Use, 33 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 368, 375-76 (1985-86).
[Vol. 39
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The model for these property rights is real property. 7 We cast the au-
thor's rights in the mold of exclusive rights of control.2" Invasion of these
rights is actionable 6n a strict liability basis,29 akin to the traditional for-
mulation of trespass to land." We describe the exceptions to the exclusive
control attending ownership as privileges.3" Copyrights are fully alienable,
subject to a copyright statute of frauds.3 2 They may be inherited,"3 be-
queathed,34 mortgaged,35 and distributed equitably upon divorce.36
Treating intellectual property as if it were real property, of course, can
be problematic. The aspects of intellectual property that create the public
goods problems that the property regime is intended to repair also make it
difficult to fit intellectual property within the real property rubric.3 7 One
difficulty, discussed at length in a recent article by Professor Wendy
Gordon, is that intellectual property lacks the tangible qualities associated
with real property. 8 In the face of intellectual property's lack of "thing-
ness," the law must supply alternative concepts to take the place of physi-
2' See, e.g., R. DE WOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 58 (1925); W. STRONG, THE
COPYRIGHT BOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 1 (2d ed. 1984).
28 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). The constitutional provision on which U.S. copyright statutes are
based is article I, section 8, clause 8, which speaks of exclusive rights:
"The Congress shall have Power ... to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries."
Professor L. Ray Patterson, however, has argued that the constitutional language, when interpreted
within its historical context, directs Congress to establish a regulatory structure rather than a system
of property rights. See Patterson, supra note 13, at 13-36. Patterson views the modern tendency to
equate copyright with property as a dangerous error in interpreting the copyright clause.
2 See, e.g., Edwards & Deutsch Lithographing Co. v. Boorman, 15 F.2d 35 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 273 U.S. 738 (1926); Gordon, supra note 4, at 1390-91.
20 See, e.g., Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359 (1951).
s See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 4, at 1391-92. Thus, the fair use privilege codified in 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (1988) shares a kinship with the privilege of necessity.
22 See 17 U.S.C. § 204 (1988); see, e.g., Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 654 F. Supp. 1129 (N.D. Cal.
1987).
22 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1988).
2, Id. See generally Nevins, The Magic Kingdom of Will-Bumping: Where Estates Law and
Copyright Law Collide, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 77 (1988) (estates containing copyright in-
terests cause problems in estate planning).
25 See 1 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 4100, at 2601 (Sept. 1989).
"6 See In re Marriage of Worth, 195 Cal. App. 3d 768, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1st Dist. 1987). See
generally Nimmer, Copyright Ownership by the Marital Community: Evaluating Worth, 36 UCLA
L. REv. 383 (1988).
37 See Lange, supra note 7, at 150.
38 See Gordon, supra note 4, at 1378-79.
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cal boundaries."9
Consider, for example, the problem of determining ownership. To as-
certain who owns a parcel of real property, we look to possession and to
the chain of record title. We can rely on the fact that the parcel is unique
in assessing possession and can resolve conflicts in the paper title chain
with reference to temporally-based priorities.' A parcel of intellectual
property, however, is neither tangible nor unique. Possession and tempo-
ral priority are therefore less than helpful concepts. How then is the law
to determine who owns an intellectual property and what that property
comprises? Different regimes of intellectual property approach this prob-
lem in different ways.
The patent system recognizes property rights only when the claimant
can prove the analogues of uniqueness and temporal priority. The inven-
tor must demonstrate that the invention is new"1 and that the inventor
was the first to create it."2 If the claimant cannot meet this burden of
proof, no patent will issue. The inventor must also specify the scope of the
rights that she claims in the invention and demonstrate that she is entitled
to them.43
The trademark system takes a different approach. The trademark
claimant proves ownership of a mark by proving that she has actually
used it in trade and that the public has come to recognize that mark as her
" See id. at 1378-84. Gordon concludes that the copyright statute provides adequate substitute
boundaries in its requirement thata work be fixed in tangible form in order to receive copyright
protection and in the limits it places on the subject matter it protects and the rights it extends. See id.
I am far less sanguine about the adequacy of the doctrines Gordon relies on as substitute boundaries.
See infra notes 223-54 and accompanying text. The substitute boundaries Gordon identifies are useful
in determining whether property rights are claimed in a particular work, but they are of little use in
sorting out competing claims to that work's contents.
" See generally R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY
711-834 (1984).
4" See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and
the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 185-86 (1987); Hughes, The
Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 306-07 (1988).
42 See Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 214-16. The patent statute contains an exception permitting
an inventor to obtain a patent on the invention notwithstanding its prior invention by someone else
who suppressed or concealed it. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988). Normally, however, only the first
inventor of an invention will be entitled to a patent.
" See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Adelman & Fran-
cione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U.
PA. L. REv. 673, 704-05 (1989); Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 207-16.
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signature."" The property rights she gains from such a showing are lim-
ited to the exclusive use of the mark in circumstances in which the public
is likely to perceive it as emanating from her.45 Thus, ownership of a
trademark gives rise to what is, in essence, a homonym. The trademark
owner has the exclusive right to use the mark in contexts in which it will
be understood in its trademark sense, but has no exclusive rights to the
use of the word in other contexts. For example, Proctor & Gamble's ex-
clusive rights in the trademark Tide®, in connection with laundry deter-
gent, do not extend to the use of the word "tide" referring to oceans.
Although the common meaning of the word "tide" may well have influ-
enced Proctor and Gamble's choice of it for a detergent mark, Proctor &
Gamble's use of Tide®, in connection with laundry detergents, has, in ef-
fect, created a homonym with a very different meaning.46
Thus, the patent system imposes a real property-like set of uniqueness
and temporal priority requirements to determine the ownership and set
the boundaries of a patent grant. The trademark system relies on actual
use in trade as an analogue to possession to determine ownership, and it
sets the boundaries of the exclusive rights to correspond with the public's
perception of the meaning of a mark.47
What is copyright's analogue to these doctrines? Surprisingly, the sys-
tem demands no comparable analysis or evaluation until actual litigation
4 The owner of a mark makes this showing either to the Patent and Trademark Office upon
registration or in court if she claims rights in an unregistered mark. See, e.g., California Cedar Prods.
Co. v. Pine Mountain Corp., 724 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1984); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508
F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1975). Although the trademark statute, as amended in 1988, permits the claimant
of a trademark to file a registration application before actually using the mark in trade, see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051(b) (1988), the claimant must demonstrate actual use before the registration will issue. See 15
U.S.C. § 1051(d).
"' See, e.g., Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1188 (1985).
" The related state law doctrine of trade secrecy, see generally Eisenberg, supra note 41, at
190-95, uses a model akin to personal property. The law requires the owner of a trade secret to
maintain a degree of actual secrecy in the nature of possession and to assert control over disclosure of
the secret to others in the nature of a bailment relationship. Should an identical secret arise from
incidents independent of the relationship, as with reverse engineering, its use is not actionable, because
the owner of the trade secret owns the secret itself but not its content. See Samuelson, Information as
Properly: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Properly
Law?, 38 OATH. U.L. REV. 365 (1989).
47 For a discussion of the relevance of temporal priority .in the trademark context, see cases cited
supra note 44. See also B. PATrISHALL & D. HILLIARD, TRADEMARKS 40-42, 246-61 (1987).
1990]
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occurs, and there is remarkably little analysis even during litigation.48
Copyright vests automatically in your shopping lists, your vacation snap-
shots, your home movies, and your telephone message slips. 49 There is
nothing that you need to prove in order to ensure that your copyright
endures until fifty years after your death. To provide the illusion of
boundaries confining your property rights, we invoke a copyright postu-
late: You own only such aspects of your writings as you added, or only
what is original with you.50 Put another way, you own only those portions
that you did not copy from someone else.51
This concept of originality .is a keystone of copyright law.52 A work is
ineligible for copyright protection except to the extent that it reflects origi-
nal authorship.53 Authorship is a term used to describe the requirement of
a non-trivial amount of creative expression;54 originality requires that the
expression "owe its origin" to the author5" rather than be copied from
another source.56 Where a work of authorship is based on preexisting
sources, copyright will protect only the portions of it that are original.57
48 See Adelman & Francione, supra note 43, at 675-76 & n.7, 705-06.
49 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1988); see Lange, supra note 7, at 157; see also Brown, Unification: A
Cheerful Requiem for Common Law Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1070, 1079-80 (1977). Before
January 1, 1978, the law required compliance with statutory formalities as a condition of federal
copyright protection. See generally A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 110-141 (5th ed. 1979).
80 See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903); 1 P. GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT § 2.2.1, at 62 (1989).
81 See, eg., 1 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 50, § 2.2.1, at 62-67; 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER,
supra note 2, § 2.01[A]; W. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 22-23 (6th ed. 1986); Ras-
kind, The Continuing Process of Refining and Adapting Copyright Principles, 31 GERMAN Y.B.
INT'L L. 478, 485 (1988).
82 See, e.g., 1 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 50, § 1.2.2.3; Yankwich, Originality in the Law of
Intellectual Property, 11 F.R.D. 457 (1951).
" 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988); see, e.g., John Mueller & Co. v. New York Arrows Soccer Team,
802 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1986).
" See Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 693 F. Supp. 1204 (D.D.C. 1988), ret'd on other grounds,
888 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989); accord, e.g., John Mueller & Co. v. New York Arrows Soccer Team,
802 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1986).
8 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
"8 See, e.g., 1 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 50, § 1.2.2.3, at 14-15.
87 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988). Indeed, the common wisdom reflected in the statute, its legislative
history, and dictum in the cases is that any portion of such a work that infringes the copyrights in
preexisting works may not be copyrighted, even if it incorporates distinguishable variations or im-
provements. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a); H.R. REp. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57-58 (1976); see, e.g.,
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936), affd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940).
But see infra notes 233-40 and accompanying text.
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Thus, originality determines the boundaries of the copyright. Its mirror
image defines the scope of copyright infringement since the statute protects
the author only from another's copying, or use, of the original portion of
her work and does not prohibit the independent (and thus original) crea-
tion of other similar works.58
The principle of limiting copyright protection to only those aspects of a
work that are original with its author, while remarkably easy to state,
proves to be impossible to apply." We lack the capacity to ascertain the
sources of individuals' inspirations. Thus, the boundaries of copyright are
inevitably indeterminate. To mitigate the mischief this could cause, we
rely on the public domain.
The concept of the public domain is another import from the realm of
real property. 0 In the intellectual property context, the term describes a
true commons61 comprising elements of intellectual property that are inel-
igible for private ownership. 2 The contents of the public domain may be
mined by any member of the public.6"
The lay understanding of the public domain in the copyright context is
that it contains works free from copyright.64 Works created before the
enactment of copyright statutes, such as Shakepeare's Macbeth or
" See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 7, at 344-45.
" See infra notes 223-56 and accompanying text.
" The term public domain gained widespread use in the late nineteenth century when the Berne
Convention adopted the term domaine public from the French. In the U.S., we had already been
using the phrase "public domain" (apparently derived from the British Royal demesne) to describe
lands owned by the federal government intended for sale, lease, or grant to members of the public.
", See Hughes, supra note 41, at 315-25. See generally Butler, The Commons Concept: An
Historical Concept with Modern Relevance, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 835 (1982); Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom,
Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711 (1986).
62 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989). The concept of a
vigorous public domain is well recognized as central to the patent law scheme, and the Supreme Court
has repeatedly insisted that material that the patent system leaves in the public domain belongs to the
public and may not be withdrawn. See id. The role of the public domain in the copyright system is
less widely acknowledged. See infra notes 189-222 and accompanying text.
61 The public domain in land, in contrast, is no longer a commons. The public domain is, rather,
such unreserved land as the federal government holds in fee on the public's behalf. The government
administers this land as if it were private property, and no member of the public is entitled to enter
the public domain without the federal government's permission. See generally G. COGGINS & C.
WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW xix-xxxi, 1-17 (1981).
64 See, e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1836 (1986).
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Pachabel's Canon, are available for fourth grade classes across the nation
to use for school assemblies without permission from any publisher or
payment of any royalties. Another class of old works in the public domain
are works once subject to copyright, but created so long ago that the copy-
right has since expired, such as Mark Twain's Huckleberry Finn.65 An
even larger class of uncopyrighted works in this country entered the public
domain because they were ineligible for U.S. copyright or failed to comply
with a formal prerequisite for securing it. The United States' first copy-
right statute expressly thrust all published works by foreign nationals into
the public domain.6" That policy continued for the next century, until it
was grudgingly replaced with an extension of copyright to foreign works
conditioned upon compliance with United States procedures. 67 Both do-
mestic and, foreign works fell into the public domain through inadequate
compliance with statutory formalities. 68 Although this second class of
works became less significant when Congress eliminated most formal pre-
requisites and international distinctions in 1988,9 it represents a massive
body of public domain works.
But the class of works not subject to copyright is, in some senses, the
least significant portion of the public domain. The most important part of
the public domain is a part we usually speak of only obliquely: the realm
comprising aipects of copyrighted works that copyright does not protect.
Judge Learned Hand discussed this facet of the public domain in connec-
tion with an infringement suit involving a play entitled Abie's Irish Rose:
We assume that the plaintiff's play is altogether original, even to an
extent that in fact it is hard to believe. We assume further that, so
60 Samuel Clemens registered the copyright in Huckleberry Finn in 1884 under the 1831 copy-
right statute for a term of 28 years. Clemens died in 1910, and in 1912, his daughter Clara
Gabrilowitsch renewed the copyright in Huckleberry Finn for an additional 28 years. The novel
entered the public domain in 1940.
See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
6' See Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106.
e See supra note 49. J.R.R, Tolkein's Lord of the Rings trilogy was but one of many casualties.
See J. TOLKEIN, THE FELLOWSHIP OF THE RING xii-xiii (1965) (author's foreword to authorized
paperback edition).
60 The Berne Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988), re-
moved most of the statutory formalities, including the requirement of copyright notice for works of
domestic origin, and eliminated even the registration requirement for works originating in foreign
signatories to the Berne Convention. See generally Ginsburg & Kernochan, One Hundred and Two
Years Later: The U.S. Joins the Berne Convention, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (1988).
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far as it has been anticipated by earlier plays of which she knew
nothing, that fact is immaterial. Still, as we have already said, her
copyright did not cover everything that might be drawn from her
play; its content went to some extent into the public domain."
The concept that portions of works protected by copyright are owned by
no one and are available for any member of the public to use is such a
fundamental one that it receives attention only when something seems to
have gone awry. 1 Although the public domain is implicit in all commen-
tary on intellectual property, it rarely takes center stage. Most of the writ-
ing on the public domain focuses on other issues: Should the duration of
copyright be extended?72 Should we recognize new species of intellectual
property rights ?7 Should federal intellectual property law cut a broad
preemptive swathe or a narrow one?7' Copyright commentary emphasizes
that which is protected more than it discusses that which is not. But a
vigorous public domain is a crucial buttress to the copyright system; with-
out the public domain, it might be impossible to tolerate copyright at all.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Ever since the first U.S. patent statute, the patent system appears to
have incorporated a strong vision of the divide between patentable inven-
70 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902
(1930).
71 See, e.g., Francione, Facing The Nation: The Standards for Copyright, Infringement, and
Fair Use of Factual Works, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 519 (1986); Karjala, Copyright, Computer Software,
and the New Protectionism, 28 JURIMETRIcs J., Fall 1987, at 33; Patterson & Joyce, Monopolizing
the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA
L. REV. 719 (1989); Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications
of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639, 696-97
(1989); Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a
Work's "Total Concept and Feel", 38 EMORY L.J. 393 (1989).
71 See, e.g., Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies,
and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 323-29 (1970); Cohen, Duration, 24 UCLA L.
REV. 1180 (1977); Krasilovsky, supra note 13.
7' See, e.g., Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70
MINN. L. REV. 579 (1985); Lange, supra note 7.
" See, e.g., Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional and Statu-
tory Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 509, 579; Brown, supra note 49; Goldstein,
Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses: Testing the Limits of
Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REv. 1107 (1977).
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tions and technology in the public domain. 5 The copyright system, in
contrast, has boasted no analogous overarching scheme. Instead, both the
scope of copyrightable subject matter and the outlines of the public do-
main developed gradually by accretion. The first U.S. copyright statute
made copyright available for "books" ' but did not spell out what portions
of such books might be subject to copyright protection. When copyright
owners brought lawsuits asserting broad claims of ownership, the courts
took on the task of defining the nature of the rights in the copyright bun-
dle. In so doing, they drew the contours of the public domain bit by bit.
This section of the article will trace this historical development in order to
begin to develop the reasons why a public domain is essential to the enter-
prise of authorship and to establish a common ground for further analysis.
The idea that a statutory copyright carries with it a dedication to the
public of aspects of or rights in the copyrighted work emerged in the case
law of the mid-nineteenth century as a matter of statutory construction.
Early copyright statutes granted limited rights in limited classes of works
for a term of short duration. Judicial opinions construing these statutes,
and the English law on which they were based, concluded that in order to
give effect to the limited statutory term and the "Limited Times" lan-
guage of the Copyright Clause, 8 statutory copyright must extinguish
common law literary rights (which authors and publishers had argued
existed as natural rights in perpetuity).79 The courts reasoned that since
Congress had expressed statutory copyright in terms of specific rights, any
other literary rights, whether or not they had once been protected at com-
mon law, must pass into the public domain upon the vesting of statutory
copyright."0 Publication was the dividing line: Once a work was pub-
'0 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
76 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
" The first U.S. copyright statute, for example, granted authors of maps, charts, or books the
rights to "print, reprint, publish or vend" for a 14 year term that could be renewed for a further 14
years. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. See generally L. PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 180-
221; Patterson, supra note 13, at 33-48.
78 See supra note 28.
"' See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 223, 8 Pet. 591 (1834); cf Donaldsons v. Becket, 4 Burr.
2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774). See generally L. PATI-ERSON, supra note 22, at 203-12;
Abrams, The, Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law
Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REv. 1119 (1983).
"' See, e.g., Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899); Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514); Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171 (O.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497).
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lished, statutory copyright became available. If the author published her
work but failed to avail herself of statutory procedures, the entire work.
entered the public domain. If she complied with the copyright statute, she
gained statutory rights, but any other rights in 'her work became part of
the public domain.
In the 1850s, Harriet Beecher Stowe published Uncle Tom's Cabin: or
Life among the Lowly and secured statutory copyright under the Copy-
right Act of 1831.81 This statute gave authors of books, maps, charts, mu-
sical compositions, prints, cuts, or engravings the "sole right and liberty of
printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending" their works.82 Stowe then
commissioned a German translation of Uncle Tom's Cabin so that she
could market her book in Pennsylvania's German-speaking community
and secured a copyright in the translation. When a competing, unautho-
rized, German translation appeared in a Philadelphia German-language
newspaper, Stowe sued to enjoin its further publication." The court held
that an unauthorized translation did not infringe on Stowe's statutory,
rights:
By the publication of Mrs. Stowe's book, the creations of the genius
and imagination of the author have become as much public property
as those of Homer or Cervantes. Uncle Tom and Topsy are as much
publici juris as Don Quixote and Sancho Panza. All her conceptions
and inventions may be used and abused by imitators, play-rights and
poetasters. They are no longer her own - those who have pur-
chased her book, may clothe them in English doggerel, in German
or Chiiese prose. Her absolute dominion and property in the cre-
ations of her genius and imagination have been voluntarily relin-
quished. All that now remains is the copyright of her book; the ex-
clusive right to print, reprint and vend it, and those only can be
called infringers of her rights or pirates of her property, who are
guilty of printing, publishing, importing or vending without her li-
cense, "copies of her book." A translation may, in loose phraseology,
be called a transcript or copy of her thoughts or conceptions, but in
no correct sense can it be called a copy of her book.84
' Act of Feb 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
" Id. at § 1. The rights subsisted for a term of 28 years, renewable for a further 14-year term.
Id. at §§ 1, 2.
8' Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514).
84 Id. at 208 (footnotes omitted).
1990]
HeinOnline  -- 39 Emory L. J. 979 1990
980 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39
In 1870, Congress expanded copyright to permit authors to "reserve the
right to dramatize or to translate their own works."85 The analysis of the
Stowe case, however, outlived its holding on the narrow issue of whether
translations infringed. Courts interpreted the scope of-the copyright grant
narrowly and continued to hold that what Congress did not grant to the
author became common property upon publication of the work containing
it.8
6
In 1879, the United States Supreme Court articulated this principle in
more general terms in Baker v. Selden.8" The plaintiff in Baker v. Selden
asserted copyright claims in a series of books about bookkeeping and in
the bookkeeping system that they described."8 Plaintiff Selden accused de-
fendant Baker of copying the Selden bookkeeping system and pirating the
bookkeeping forms published in Selden's books.8" The Court held that the
copyrights in the books neither conferred rights in the bookkeeping system
itself, nor protected the forms required to use the system. Both system and
forms belonged to the public:
85 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 212. In the intervening years, Congress had added
dramatic compositions and photographs to the list of copyrightable works and established an exclusive
right of public performance for dramatic compositions. See Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat.
138; Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540. The 1870 statute added paintings, drawings, prints,
statues, and models to the list of protectible works. Composers of musical compositions did not acquire
an exclusive right of public performance until 1897. See Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481.
8 See, e.g., White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908); Holmes v.
Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899); Corcoran v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 121 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1941);
Kreymborg v. Durante, 21 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); Fitch v. Young, 230 F. 743
(S.D.N.Y. 1911).
87 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
88 Charles Selden was a Cincinnati accountant who devised a bookkeeping method chiefly valua-
ble for condensing numerous columns of numbers onto only two forms. Selden wrote, published, and
copyrighted five books describing his bookkeeping system; each of the books contained copies of the
ruled forms Selden had developed. With his copyrights secured, Selden engaged a salesman to travel
through Ohio and Indiana and attempt to sell the Selden bookkeeping system to midwestern account-
ants. According to the testimony given at trial, the salesman gave his sales pitch at the Xenia, Ohio,
office of one William C. Baker, the auditor for Green County, and left one of Selden's books for
Baker's perusal. Baker allegedly recommended that Green County switch to the Selden system, but
the county commissioners balked at paying Selden's price. The following year, Baker apparently de-
veloped his own variant of the Selden system and designed his own variant of the Selden condensed
ledger forms. After successfully introducing his own forms to Green County, Baker achieved their
adoption by county and state government auditors throughout Ohio. Selden discovered Baker's activi-
ties but died before bringing suit. His widow sued Baker the following year. See Transcript of
Records at 1-19, Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (No. 99-184).
88 Baker's forms were not identical to Selden's, but they adopted the same essential strategy. See
Transcript of Records, supra note 88, at 16.
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The very object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is
to communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains.
But this object would be frustrated if the knowledge could not be
used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the book. And where
the art it teaches cannot be used without employing the methods and
diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them,
such methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary inci-
dents to the art, and given therewith to the public; not given for the
purpose of publication in other works explanatory of the art, but for
the purpose of practical application.9"
Baker v. Selden spawned several overlapping lines of authority on what
aspects of a copyrighted work a copyright will not protect. The most
straightforward application of Baker v. Selden denies copyright to blank
forms.9" A second line of cases denies copyright protection to utilitarian
articles. 2 The third, most fundamental line of authority prohibits copy-
right protection for ideas, theories, processes, or systems.9" The fourth
outgrowth of Baker v. Selden is known as the merger doctrine.94 Where
the unprotectible ideas in a work are inseparable from the work's expres-
sion, copyright may not prohibit the use of expression necessary to convey
the ideas."
In the twentieth century, Congress extended the scope of copyright
enormously by granting more expansive rights in an increasingly inclusive
array of works.98 Most of what Baker v. Selden and later cases assigned
Baker, 101 U.S. at 103.
9 See, e.g., M.M. Business Forms Corp. v. Uarco, Inc., 472 F.2d 1137, 1139 (6th Cir. 1973);
Bibbero Sys. v. Colwell Sys., Inc., 1988 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 26,270 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Al-
drich v. Remington Rand, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Tex. 1942). But see Norton Printing Co. v.
Augustana Hosp., 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 133 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
"' See, e.g., Amberg File & Index Co. v. Shea Smith & Co., 82 F. 314 (7th Cir. 1897); Clair v.
Philadelphia Storage Battery Co., 43 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Pa. 1941); Serrana v. Jefferson, 33 F. 347
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888). But see Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984).
13 See, e.g., Affiliated Enters. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958 (1st Cir. 1936); Stone & McCarrick, Inc.
v. Dugan Piano Co., 210 F. 399 (E.D. La. 1914); Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 411 (S.D.N.Y.
1913). But see Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
9' See, e.g., W. PATRY, supra note 51, at 32-34.
9 See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971); Con-
tinental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958); see
also Morrisey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
" See Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989).
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to the public domain has nonetheless remained unprotected. Some com-
mentators have attributed this to the innate conservatism of courts and
have suggested that Baker v. Selden and its progeny be reinterpreted as
obsolete constructions of superseded statutes. 7 Others have insisted that
Congress relied on the limitations derived from Baker v. Selden in choos-
ing to extend copyright's boundaries. 8 In either case,9" the doctrines that
evolved from Baker v. Selden have ascended to the level of copyright
axioms1 oo
Like most legal axioms, the doctrines derived from Baker v. Selden
have never been applied with consistency. Courts have denied protection
in one case, concluding that a defendant appropriated only the plaintiff's
ideas, and found infringement in a seemingly indistinguishable case. 01
Courts have held one work to be fatally utilitarian and then turned
around and protected another that seems equally utilitarian.'0 2 They have
refused to enjoin the copying of one blank form while imposing liability
for the reproduction of another, equally blank form. 0 3 The case law does
not supply many reliable indicia describing what aspects of a copyrighted
work are proprietary and what aspects are common property. Trends in
'" See I M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.18[A]-[D]; Goldstein, supra note 7, at
228-32. Professor Goldstein's more recent work appears to retreat from this view. See 1 P. GOLD-
STEIN, supra note 50, at 77-78.
" See Patterson & Joyce, supra note 71, at 767-69; Reichman, supra note 71, at 693 n.288;
Yankwich, What is Fair Use?, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 205-07 (1954).
" Analysis of the legislative history accompanying the 1909 and 1976 copyright statutes indi-
cates that the Register of Copyrights and the private parties who negotiated among themselves to
arrive at the language of the bills that Congress enacted paid significant attention to these court-
crafted limitations although the members of Congress themselves paid little attention to such details.
See Litman, supra note 96, at 334-37.
100 See, e.g., Brinson, Copyrighted Software: Separating the Protected Expression from Unpro-
tected Ideas, A Starting Point, 29 B.C.L. REv. 803, 811 (1988); Goldstein, supra note 7, at 228.
1.. Compare, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 902 (1930), with Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936), a/f'd,
309 U.S. 390 (1940).
"02 Compare, e.g., Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985)
with, e.g., Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980). See generally
Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles,
67 MINN. L. REv. 707, 736-37 (1983).
... Compare, e.g., Januz Mktg. Communications, Inc. v. Doubleday & Co., 569 F. Supp. 76
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), and Carlisle v. Colusa County, 57 F. 979 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1893), with, e.g., Har-
court Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) and
Brightley v. Littleton, 37 F. 103 (C.C.E.D.P.A. 1888). See generally Gorman, supra note 13, at 580-
82.
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lines of cases, however, shed some light on the strains to which courts
were responding when they consigned particular sorts of material to the
public domain.
In the wake of the Copyright Act of 1909,04 courts developed rules for
particular classes of works and determined infringement according to the
class of the works in dispute. Three lines of cases, which I will term the
systems cases, the motion picture cases, and the directory cases, reveal
three different approaches to the public domain.
A. The Systems Cases
The line of cases denying protection to systems followed a common pat-
tern, seen earlier in Baker v. Selden. In these cases, plaintiff had secured
a copyright in a book, lecture, or chart explaining a system or procedure
and sought to parlay the copyright into a monopoly on the use of the
system or procedure.1 °5 Courts consistently held that publication of the
work describing the system dedicated the system itself to the public.1 ° In
order to secure protection of a way of doing things, the courts explained,
an author must seek protection under the patent laws."° In Aldrich v.
Remington Rand, Inc.,"'8 for example, the author of a manual on munic-
ipal tax assessment and collection sued the City of Fort Worth for adopt-
'0 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075-1088 (repealed 1978).
105 See, e.g., Dorsey v. Old Surety Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1939) (family group
insurance policies); Selzer v. Corem, 107 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1939) (rules for roller derby races); Affili-
ated Enters. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958 (1st Cir. 1936) (promotional lotteries in motion picture theaters);
Brief English Sys. v. Owen, 48 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1931) (shorthand system using Roman characters);
Chautauqua School of Nursing v. National School of Nursing, 238 F. 151 (2d Cir. 1916) (illustrated
twelve-step instruction in hypodermic injections); Aldrich v. Remington Rand, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 732
(N.D. Tex. 1942) (tax bookkeeping system); Crume v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 55 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 267 (N.D. Ill. 1942) (reorganization of insurance company), affd, 140 F.2d 182 (7th Cir.
1944); Muller v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (traffic separation
system for bridge on-ramps); Long v. Jordan, 29 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (pension system);
Stone & McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan Piano Co., 210 F. 399 (E.D. La. 1914) (piano promotion), affd,
220 F. 837 (5th Cir. 1915).
106 See, e.g., Affiliated Enters. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958 (1st Cir. 1936). But see Selzer v. Corem,
26 F. Supp. 892 (N.D. Ind.) (conducting roller derby would be unauthorized dramatization of plain-
tiff's book describing roller derby rules), rev'd, 107 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1939).
107 See, e.g., Brief English Sys. v. Owen, 48 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1931); Seltzer v. Sunbrock, 22 F.
Supp. 621 (S.D. Cal. 1938).
108 52 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Tex. 1942).
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ing the system described in his manual and the forms he had devised to
illustrate the system. The court dismissed the plaintiffs suit with the fol-
lowing observation: I
The basic distinction between rights under patents and rights under
copyrights must be constantly kept in mind, one being that the pub-
lic is not free to use the invention described in a patent, but it is
privileged to use whatever information is imparted in a copyrighted
book about any system, art or manufacture described in it; further-
more, that such use is the consideration the public receives for the
grant of copyright.1"'
The systems cases reflect the notion that the public domain exacts a toll as
the price for a statutory copyright and that courts will enforce the public's
claim to common property even when the ideas or systems reflected in
works are ingenious.
B. The Film Cases
Early cases were protective of the proprietary interests that authors and
producers claimed in dramatic material.110 The growth of the motion pic-
ture industry, however, deluged the courts with claims of infringement."' 1
109 Id. at 734.
110 See, e.g., Chappell & Co. v. Fields, 210 F. 864 (2d Cir. 1914); Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas.
1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3,552).
I See Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911); Barry v. Hughes, 103 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.
1939); Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939); Dezendorf v. Twentieth Cen-
tury-Fox Film Corp., 99 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1938); London v. Biograph Co., 231 F. 696 (2d Cir.
1916); Kustoff v. Chaplin, 32 F. Supp. 772 (S.D. Cal. 1940), aft'd, 120 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1941);
Lynch v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Rapp v. Harold Lloyd
Corp., 33 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Sheets v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 33 F. Supp.
389 (D.D.C. 1940); Clancy v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 37 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 406 (S.D.N.Y.
1938); Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 25 F. Supp. 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), rev'd, 106 F.2d
83 (2d Cir. 1939); Bein v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 35 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 78 (S.D.N.Y, 1937),
aj'd, 105 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1939); Caruthers v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 906
(S.D.N.Y. 1937); Davies v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 20 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); Shipman v.
R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd, 100 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1938);
Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Cal. 1935); Ornstein v. Paramount
Prods., Inc., 9 F. Supp. 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Patten v. Superior Talking Pictures, Inc., 8 F. Supp.
196 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 7 F. Supp. 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1934),
rev'd, 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936), affd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940); Barbadillo v. Goldwyn, 42 F.2d 881
(S.D. Cal. 1930); Witwer v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 46 F.2d 792 (S.D. Cal. 1930), revd, 65 F.2d I
(9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 296 U.S. 669 (1933); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 34 F.2d 145
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In the typical case, plaintiff was the author of a book, play, or story that
had enjoyed only moderate success, and claimed that defendant's motion
picture had been based on plaintiff's work. 12 Many of the claims were
plausible,"' and most were sincere. 11 4 Courts, however, manifested in-
creasing reluctance to find infringement.
Some cases denied relief on the ground that the plot of the plaintiff's
work was an old one and could be found in other works already in the
public domain.11 5 Courts, however, had difficulty articulating why the
mere fact that a work incorporated a standard plot should mean that its
copying was not actionable. Neither the language of the copyright statute
nor the cases construing it seemed to impose a requirement that copyright
should protect only that which was new in some absolute sense. Both the
statute 16 and the case law 1. extended protection to modest recasting of
old material. Motion picture defendants, nonetheless, introduced sundry
examples of prior similar works into the record, but were rarely successful
(S.D.N.Y. 1929), affid, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1930); Curwood v. Affili-
ated Distrib., 283 F. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1922); Stodart v. Mutual Film Co., 249 F. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1917),
affid mern., 249 F. 513 (2d Cir. 1918); Barsha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 32 Cal. App. 2d 556, 90
P.2d 371 (1939); O'Neill v. General Film Co., 171 A.D. 460, 157 N.Y.S. 599 (Sup. Ct.), modified,
171 A.D. 854, 157 N.Y.S. 1028 (1916); Tutelman v. Stokowski, 44 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 47 (Pa. Ct. C.
P. 1939).
1.2 See, e.g., Witwer v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 46 F.2d 792 (S.D. Cal. 1930), rev'd, 65 F.2d 1 (9th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 296 U.S. 669 (1933).
11 See, e.g., Ornstein v. Paramount Prods., Inc., 9 F. Supp. 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Witwer v.
Harold Lloyd Corp., 46 F.2d 792 (S.D. Cal. 1930), rev'd, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 296
U.S. 669 (1933).
114 See, e.g., London v. Biograph Co., 231 F. 696 (2d Cir. 1916); Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 34 F.2d 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), aff'd, 45 F.2d 119 ,(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1930).
11 E.g., London v. Biograph Co., 231 F. 696, 698 (2d Cir. 1916) ("The plot is highly dramatic
and calculated to appeal powerfully to reader or spectator. But it is an old one; it appears in Chau-
cer's Pardoner's Tale."); see also Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 23 (9th Cir.), revzg on
other grounds 46 F.2d 792 (S.D. Cal. 1930), cert. dismissed, 296 U.S. 669 (1933); Ornstein v. Para-
mount Prods., Inc., 9 F. Supp. 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 34 F.2d
145 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), aff d, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1930).
110 Section 4 of the Copyright Act of 1909 extended copyright protection to "all the writings of
an author." Copyright Act, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (1909). Section 5 included in its enumeration
of copyrightable works "directories, gazetteers and other compilations" as well as "[rieproductions of a
work of art." Id. at 1076-77.
217 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903); Burrow Giles Litho-
graphing Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); Edwards & Deutsch Lithographing Co. v. Boorman, 15
F.2d 35 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 738 (1926); American Code Co. v. Rensinger, 282 F. 824
(2d Cir. 1922).
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in demonstrating that plaintiffs had in fact relied upon them. 1 ,
Courts might have permitted copying in situations in which the defend-
ant studio could demonstrate that it had drawn its story from Chaucer
rather than the plaintiff," 9 but in many cases the evidence that the motion
picture producers had in fact relied on the plaintiff's work was compel-
ling.120 Furthermore, the alleged similarities between the accusing story
and the accused motion picture typically went beyond a story's broad out-
lines and overall themes, encompassing similarities of setting, action, char-
acter, and detail that could not easily be attributed to old classics. 21
Although courts might have wished to seek refuge in a standard that
excused unintentional duplication, the principle that unintentional or sub-
conscious copying gave rise to liability had been well settled for some
time. 22 Moreover, in some cases the proof of conscious copying was per-
suasive. Courts, therefore, turned to the rationale that had enabled them
to rule for defendants in the systems cases: They claimed plots, themes,
titles, characters, ideas, and situations on behalf of the public domain.
In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,23 for example, the plaintiff
"' See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp, 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936), aff'd, 309
U.S. 390 (1940); Ornstein v. Paramount Prods., Inc., 9 F. Supp. 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); see also Haas
v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (plaintiff's song repeats chorus from HMS Pinafore,
but there is no evidence that plaintiff ever heard HMS Pinafore).
" See London v. Biograph Co., 231 F. 696, 698 (2d Cir. 1916).
o See, e.g., Ornstein v. Paramount Prods., Inc., 9 F. Supp. 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Witwer v.
Harold Lloyd Corp., 46 F.2d 792 (S.D.Cal. 1930), revd, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 296
U.S. 669 (1933); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 34 F.2d 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), aft'd, 45 F.2d
119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1930). Other cases were decided on the assumption that
any similarities were the result of copying, thereby permitting the court to enter judgment on the
pleadings and avoid a full trial. See, e.g., Caruthers v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 906
(S.D.N.Y. 1937); Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), affd,
100 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1938).
121 See, e.g., London v. Biograph Co., 231 F. 696 (2d Cir. 1916); Echevarria v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Cal. 1935); Ornstein v. Paramount Prods., Inc., 9 F. Supp. 896
(S.D.N.Y. 1935); Witwer v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 46 F.2d 792 (S.D. Cal. 1930), ret,'d, 65 F.2d 1
(9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 296 U.S. 669 (1933); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 34 F.2d 145
(S.D.N.Y. 1929), affid, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1930).
,' See, e.g., Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Haas v. Leo Feist,
Inc., 234 F. 105, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). But cf. Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F. 2d 1, 17 (9th
Cir.) (although unintentional copying is actionable, plaintiff's complaint alleges only deliberate copy-
ing), cert. dismissed, 296 U.S. 669 (1933).
,22 34 F.2d 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), af'd, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902
(1930).
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claimed that the film The Cohens and the Kelleys infringed her successful
play Abie's Irish Rose. Both the play and the motion picture were roman-
tic comedies about a Jewish family and an Irish Catholic family whose
children had secretly married. Nichols presented evidence that Universal
Pictures had tried to purchase the motion picture rights to Abie's Irish
Rose, that Universal screenwriters had studied the play in preparing the
movie scenario, and that Universal had advertised The Cohens and the
Kelleys as an Abie's Irish Rose for the screen.12 The trial court agreed
that Universal had relied on Nichol's play in making its film, but held
that it had taken only that which anyone was entitled to use. 25 On ap-
peal, the Second Circuit expressly declined to base its affirmance on the
theory that the plaintiff had harvested her plot from older sources in the
public domain and could therefore not claim to own it. The court assumed
that everything in the play owed its origin to Nichols, but held that the
play's broad outlines and the ideas it expressed nonetheless were part of
the public domain.12
Assimilating the broad outlines of a story's plot to the systems and ideas
in the public domain, however, did not suffice to dispose of many claims.
Plaintiffs commonly drew the courts' attention to a variety of similarities
of a more detailed nature.127 The courts excused many of those similari-
ties on the grounds that they were trite, 2" stock,129 common, 3 0 or
cliche. 3 ' In the early 1940s, Judge Leon Yankwich, a literate francophile
sitting on the federal district court for the Southern District of California,
gave these sorts of details the name scnes &faire.'3 2 Scnes bfaire, Judge
12I d. at 150.
125 Id. at 148-50.
128 Nichols, 45 F.2d at 122.
121 See, e.g., London v. Biograph Co., 231 F. 696 (2d Cir. 1916); Echevarria v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Cal. 1935).
128 See, e.g., Ornstein v. Paramount Prods., Inc., 9 F. Supp. 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
118 See, e.g., Nichols, 34 F.2d 145.
'0 See, e.g., London v. Biograph Co., 231 F. 696 (2d Cir. 1916); Caruihers v. R.K.O. Radio
Pictures, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
1"1 See, e.g., Gropper v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); accord
Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Cal. 1935).
152 Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013, 1017 (S.D. Cal. 1942):
The other small details, on which stress is laid, such as the playing of the piano, the
prayer, the hunger motive, as it called, are inherent in the situation itself. They are what
the French call "scenes a faire". Once having placed two persons in a church during a big
storm, it was inevitable that incidents like these and others which are, necessarily, associ-
1990]
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Yankwich explained, "are the common stock of literary composition -
'cliches' - to which no one can claim literary ownership." '
Analyzed within this framework, most motion picture claims evapo-
rated."' The defendant studio may have availed itself of plaintiff's ideas,
themes, and general plot and may have expressed those ideas, themes, and
plot through the same standard scenes and common details that plaintiff
had used, but these aspects of plaintiff's work. were public property.
What accounts for the courts' reluctance to resolve these plagiarism
claims in plaintiffs' favor? Some courts were undoubtedly responding to
their perceptions of economic realities. Even if Harold Lloyd had appro-
priated the plot for his film The Freshman from H.C. Witwer's magazine
story, the film's million-dollar success owed more to Lloyd's performance
than it did to Witwer's plot.1 5 Similarly, the success of the film Stowaway
had more to do with its star, Shirley Temple, than with the premise that
Twentieth Century-Fox allegedly plagiarized from Joan Storm's play
Dancing Destiny.""' Beyond the courts' sensitivity to the financial equities
in particular cases, however, there also appears to be an awareness of the
limitations inherent in dramatic and film art forms. The motion pictures
before the court and the stories that were claimed to inspire them were
typical. If one motion picture infringed because it told a familiar story,
other films not before the court were equally vulnerable.
ated with such a situation should force themselves upon the writer in developing the theme.
Courts have held repeatedly that such similarities and incidental details necessary to the
environment or setting of an action are not the material of which copyrightable originality
consists.
See also Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 174 F. Supp. 733 (S.D. Cal. 1959), rev'd, 287
F.2d 478 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 368 U.S. 801 (1961); Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F.
Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal. 1945). See generally Yankwich, supra note 52.
... Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270, 278 (S.D. Cal. 1945).
' See, e.g., O'Rourke v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 480 (D. Mass. 1942); Grop-
per v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). But see Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp, 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936), affd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940); Stonesifer v. Twenti-
eth Century-Fox Film Co., 48 F. Supp. 196 (S.D. Cal. 1942), affid, 140 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1944).
ISS See Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 296 U.S. 669
(1933); id. at 46-47 (McCormick, J., dissenting).
" See Dezendorf v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 32 F. Supp. 359 (S.D. Cal. 1940),
aff'd, 118 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1941).
[Vol. 39
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C. The Directory Cases
In the systems and motion picture cases, the solicitude of the courts for
the creative process led them to assert public ownership of creative mate-
rial. One might have expected such courts to be especially reluctant to
protect facts under the rubric of copyright. Surprisingly, however, courts
gave copyright protection to facts without seriously questioning the pro-
priety of doing so."'
The uncopyrightability of facts themselves is well settled today,1"8 but
was far from certain early in the century. News was thought to be un-
copyrightable,139 but that proposition remained untested for many years
because of the impracticality of daily registration. 4 Neither courts nor
commentators generalized from the public domain status of news to any
conclusion about whether other facts or information could be protected. 41
'The question of the copyrightability of facts qua facts was not squarely
raised before a U.S. court until the 1919 decision in Myers v. Mail &
Express Co. 42 Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Myers concluded that
facts recorded in a historical work were dedicated to the public and could
be used freely by subsequent authors.' 4 3 None of the authority on which
137 See generally Lurvey, "Verifing" from Prior Directories - "Fair Use" or Theft? Delicate
Distinctions in the Protection of Copyrighted Compilations, 13 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 271,
282-89 (1967).
"' See, e.g., 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.11[A]; Denicola, supra note 14, at
524-26; Francione, supra note 71, at 520-21, 551-75; Shipley & Hay, Protecting Research: Copy-
right, Common-Law Alternatives, and Federal Preemption, 63 N.C.L. REV. 125 (1984).
239 See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918); Chicago Record-
Herald Co. v. Tribune Ass'n, 275 F. 797, 798 (7th Cir. 1921); Davies v. Bowes, 209 F. 53, 55-56
(S.D.N.Y. 1913), aJfd on other grounds, 219 F. 178 (2d Cir. 1915); R. BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS
HISTORY AND ITS LAW 87-89 (1912).
140 See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. at 233.
141 See, e.g., American Trotting Register Ass'n v. Gocher, 70 F. 237 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1895); List
Publishing Co. v. Keller, 30 F. 772 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887); E. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 394-99
(1879); see also T. SCRuTrON, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 110-23 (4th ed. 1903) (British law).
" 36 C.O. Bull. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1919). One earlier decision, Kennerley v. Simonds, 247 F. 822
(S.D.N.Y. 1917), presented the same question but was decided on other grounds. Defendant Simonds
had written a history book and assigned the copyright to a publisher. Simonds subsequently wrote
another history book on the same subject, and the publisher brought suit for copyright infringement.
The court held for Simonds on the ground that in writing the second book he had consulted the same
preexisting sources that he had used for his earlier book, rather than copying the book itself. See id. at
826.
243 Meyers, 36 C.O. Bull. at 478-79.
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Hand relied, however, was squarely on point, and the Myers decision re-
mained unreported until 1970.144 Two years after Myers, in an opinion
involving competing directories of jewelers' trademarks, Judge Hand re-
peated his conclusion that facts themselves are common property. 1" He
suggested in dictum, however, that the author of a factual directory was
not entitled to copy its information from a competing directory.14 6 On ap-
peal, the Second Circuit went further, resting its decision on the holding
that the reproduction of information from a copyrighted directory was it-
self infringement. 147 The Ninth Circuit relied on the Second Circuit's
analysis in ruling that the reproduction of information from a copyrighted
telephone directory was infringement. 48 Other courts followed. 49
The directory cases predicated protection of factual works on the labor
involved in compiling facts.1"' A subsequent compiler was not permitted
to rely on a copyrighted directory, although she was free to publish an
identical collection of facts if she first obtained those facts through consul-
tation of preexisting sources.'5 There was nothing innovative about these
cases: A long line of British cases had protected factual compilations
against competing second-comers,'152 and nineteenth-century American
cases had followed their British counterparts.1 53 What makes the directory
cases noteworthy is their coexistence with cases holding facts to be unpro-
tectible in other contexts. During the same period that courts took a pro-
tectionist view in directory cases, opinions considering historical fiction,
drama, and film insisted that facts belonged in the public domain.
154
'44 See 36 C.O. Bull. at iii.
145 Jewelers' Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 274 F. 932, 935 (S.D.N.Y.
1921), aff'd, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
148 Jewelers', 274 F. at 935.
1 SeeJewelers', 281 F. at 92-95.
148 See Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937).
149 See, e.g., Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809 (7th Cir.
1942); Sammons v. Larkin, 38 F. Supp. 649 (D. Mass. 1940).
I 0 See, e.g., Jewelers' Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922); see also Denicola, supra note 14, at 529 & n.64; Ginsburg,
Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Infornation, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1990).
551 See, e.g., Produce Reporter Co. v. Fruit Produce Rating Agency, 1 F.2d 58 (N.D. Il. 1924).
12 See cases cited in Lurvey, supra note 137, at 273-76.
"' See, e.g., American Trotting Register Ass'n v. Gocher, 70 F. 237 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1895); List
Publishing Co. v. Keller, 30 F. 772 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887); cases cited in Lurvey, supra note 137, at
276-81.
'" See, e.g., Caruthers v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1937);
[Vol. 39
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While courts in the motion picture cases dissected similarities between
works to determine whether the similarities involved copyrightable expres-
sion rather than unprotectible plot, theme, sc~ne a faire, or fact,155 the
same courts in directory cases engaged in no comparable inquiry.'56 If
plaintiff could prove that defendant had used plaintiff's directory as the
source of its own, then plaintiff recovered for copyright infringement
without regard to the copyrightability of the copied material. 15' Although
these cases are still followed today,' the modern view is that their rea-
soning was aberrant.'59
Courts and commentators have advanced a variety of theories to explain
the paradox between protecting information in compilations of facts and
insisting that facts are public property in connection with other works.'60
I will offer my own modest suggestions for reconciling these cases in a
subsequent section of this article.' 6 ' For now, it is enough to note that the
three lines of cases turned to the refuge of the public domain in response
to different sorts of pressure.
In the systems cases, authors sought to establish ownership of an entire
way of doing things through the simple expedient of writing a book about
it. Although the patent statute offered a rigorous procedure for claiming
property rights in innovative solutions and proving the scope of one's enti-
tlement, these authors sought to cripple their competitors while avoiding
the rigors of the patent system. Courts responded by advancing the quid
pro quo argument that the public exacts a toll in return for statutory
Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Cal. 1935); Maddux v. Grey, 43
F.2d 441 (S.D. Cal. 1930). See generally Denicola, supra note 14, at 535-36.
155 See, e.g., Caruthers v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1937);
Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Cal. 1935).
"' See, e.g., Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); Produce Reporter Co.
v. Fruit Produce Rating Agency, 1 F.2d 58 (N.D. Il1. 1924).
117 See, e.g., Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937).
... See, e.g., United Tel. Co. v. Johnson Publishing Co., 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988); National
Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. I1. 1982); Northwestern Bell
Tel. Co. v. Bedco of Minn., Inc., 501 F. Supp. 299 (D. Minn. 1980).
159 See, e.g., Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (5th Cir. 1981); 1
M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 3.04; W. PATRY, supra note 51, at 63-64; Gorman,
supra note 13, at 573-76.
' See National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ill.
1982); Denicola, supra note 14, at 527-35; Ginsburg, supra note 150; Gorman, supra note 13; Lur-
vey, supra note 137, at 286-300; Raskind, supra note 51, at 484-99.
11 See infra notes 285-89 and accompanying text.
1990]
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copyright. In the film cases, courts struggled with competing claims to
exclusive ownership of themes and embellishments common to myriad fic-
tional works. They replied by holding the familiar elements incapable of
private appropriation. Finally, in the directory cases, authors claimed
ownership in material they could not plausibly assert that they had
originated, but that they had nonetheless expended significant labor in col-
lecting. Courts granted protection to the labor involved.
The courts' strategy seems to have been a reactive one, and it yielded no
blueprint of the public domain's outer limits and no overall rationale for'
its existence. There is, however, a common thread in these three lines of
cases. Courts invoked the public domain when the breadth of plaintiffs'
asserted property rights threatened, as a practical matter, to prevent many
other authors from pursuing their craft. Courts thus seem to have recog-
nized, at least implicitly, that copyright should promote the enterprise of
authorship and that this goal may at times be inconsistent with protecting
or rewarding individual authors.
D. Statutory Codification
By the late 1950s, when Congress began the revision process that
culminated in the 1976 Copyright Act, 162 the outlines of the public do-
main in copyrighted works were reasonably clear. Some of the rules defin-
ing the public domain were incorporated into the 1976 statute;6 36 other
aspects were expressed in Copyright Office regulations. 164 Still more as-
pects appeared only in the case law. 65
Copyright did not protect ideas, methods, systems, 66 facts, 87 utilitarian
..2 Pub. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(1988)).
263 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) (ideas, systems); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 113 (useful articles); 17
U.S.C. § 105 (works of the federal government).
'" See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1989) (words and short phrases); 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(c) (blank
forms).
15 See, e.g., Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.) (sc~nes a faire),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
166 See, e.g., Gayle v. Gillis, 167 F. Supp. 416 (D. Mass. 1958).
187 See, e.g., Oxford Book Co. v. College Entrance Book Co., 98 F.2d 688 (2d Cir, 1938);
Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Lake v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 140 F.
Supp. 707 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
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objects,"68 titles,16 themes, 70 plots,' 7 ' scbnes & faire,"2 words, short
phrases and idioms,'17 3 literary characters,' 74 style,17 5 or works of the fed-
eral government.' 6 This hodgepodge of unprotectible matter was without
overarching justification then, and it remains so today.
In the years since the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, litigation
has put increasing pressure on the public domain. The 1976 Act's expan-
sion of subject matter eligible for copyright protection has multiplied
copyright cases and nurtured new claims to exclusive rights in the basic
building blocks of a variety of different forms of expression. The stat-
ute's protection of television broadcasts, for example, has led to litigation
over how much of what we see on television can be claimed as property.1 8
The extension of federal copyright protection to unpublished works has
created disputes over what aspects of the content of unpublished works are
proscribed to the researcher.'" 9 Copyright protection of computer software
16. See, e.g., Fulmer v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 1021 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
169 See, e.g., Weissman v. Radio Corp. of America, 80 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Lone
Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 39 F. Supp. 487 (W.D.S.C. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 124 F.2d 650 (4th
Cir. 1942); Affiliated Enters. v. Rock-Ola Mfrs. Corp., 23 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ill. 1937); Brondfield v.
Paramount Pictures Corp., 200 N.Y. Misc. 883, 107 N.Y.S.2d 698 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
170 See, e.g., Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1938); Warshawsky
v. Carter, 132 F. Supp. 758 (D.D.C. 1955); Roe-Lawton v. Hal E. Roach Studios, 18 F.2d 126 (S.D.
Cal. 1927); Ware v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 413 (Cal. App. 1967).
171 See, e.g., Scott v. WKJG, Inc., 376 F.2d 467 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1967).
172 See Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
980 (1976); Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal. 1945).
M See, e.g., Morris v. Wilson, 189 F. Supp. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), affid, 295 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 1004 (1962).
17 See, e.g., Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955); Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox,'39 F. Supp. 487 (W.D.S.C.
1941), rev'd on other grounds, 124 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1942); Burtis v. Universal Pictures Co., 40
Cal.2d 823, 256 P.2d 933 (1953).
172 See, e.g., Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
176 See, e.g., Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 936 (1970); B. RINGER & P. GITUN, COPYRIGHTS 19 (1965).
17 See, e.g., Raskind, supra note 51, at 479-80.
178 See, e.g., National Assoc. of Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675 F.2d 367, 378-
80 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (football games); id. at 377 (order of programs in broadcast day); Novak v. NBC,
716 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (comedy sketches about Tarzan and Frankenstein); Barrs/Fraser
Enters. v. Goodson-Todman Enters., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1887 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (format of TV
game show); Chuck Blore & Don Richman, Inc. v. 20/20 Advertising Inc., 674 F. Supp. 671 (D.
Minn. 1987) (style of commercial and use of particular actress).
179 See, e.g., New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 884 F.2d 659, 660-61 (2d Cir.
1990]
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has generated lawsuits claiming that copyright provides exclusive rights to
the "look and feel" of programs 180 or to the user interfaces they
employ. 81
Some courts have responded to the flood of litigation and to the breadth
of asserted claims by expanding the boundaries of categories of public do-
main material. The Second and Ninth Circuits have extended the doctrine
that facts are common property to encompass analysis of facts, theories
about facts, and ordinary ways in which facts may be described." 2 Courts
have revived the sc~nes b faire doctrine, invented in the context of motion
picture infringement cases,"" and applied it to a variety of new con-
texts.'8 4 Other courts, in contrast, have questioned the policies underlying
the law's failure to recognize property rights in valuable categories of
public domain material 5 or have interpreted the scope of such categories
narrowly.'88
1989) (Miner, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 662-63 (Newman, J., dissenting);
Lucas, A Ruling that Hobbles Historians, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1990, at All, col. 2.
180 See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1428 (N.D. Cal. 1989);
Samuelson & Glushko, Comparing the Views of Lawyers and User Interface Designers on the
Software Copyright "Look and Feel" Lawsuits, 30 JURIMEMiCs J., Fall 1989, at 121; Taking the
Stand: The Look-and-Feel Issue Examined, PC MAG., May 26, 1987, at 155.
18' See Mcneil, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41
STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1079-83 (1989); see also, e.g., Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., 12
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
182 See Narell v. Freeman, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (9th Cir. 1989); Landsberg v. Scrabble
Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1984); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Hoehling
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Ginsburg,
Sabotaging and Reconstructing History: A Comment on the Scope of Copyright Protection in Works
of History after Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 29 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOc' U.S.A. 647 (1982).
183 See supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text. In the years between 1959, see Bradbury v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 174 F. Supp. 733 (S.D. Cal. 1959), rev'd, 287 F.2d 478 (9th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 368 U.S. 801 (1961), and 1976, see Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d
87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976), the schnes afaire doctrine was cited by no court and
appeared to be moribund.
184 See, e.g., Narell v. Freeman, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (9th Cir. 1989) (historical non-
fiction); Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988) (computer games); Durham
Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980) (dolls); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,
639 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (greeting cards), af'd, 833 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1987).
8' See, e.g., National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ill.
1982).
188 See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America, 623 F. Supp.
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III. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS
Copyright protection, once limited to maps, charts, and books,18 7 now
extends to an extraordinary variety of products that saturate our society.
Copyright cases no longer can be classified within subject-matter lines,
and courts and commentators have sought to articulate general principles
dividing what copyright protects or should protect from what it does not
or should not. 8
Meanwhile, the term "public domain" has fallen out of fashion as a
description of unprotectible aspects of copyrighted works. Courts and com-
mentators speak instead of "uncopyrightable" or "nonprotectible" mate-
rial." 9 The distinction is a minor one, but the new vocabulary obscures
the positive rationale for denying copyright protection and, instead, draws
attention to the negative rationales. As Congress has enacted statutes ex-
panding the range of subject matter entitled to copyright, 90 the categories
of material that copyright does not protect have struck many as increas-
ingly anomalous.19 Protectors of the public domain have found them-
selves on the defensive. When they have explained why it is that copyright
should not protect ideas, facts, stock scenes, titles, or characters, they have
attempted to explain what aspects of copyrightable works of authorship it
is that ideas, facts, stock scenes, titles, or characters lack.192 These argu-
ments have in turn been vulnerable to attack.
1485, 1498 (D. Minn. 1985). See generally Karjala, supra note 71.
187 See supra note 77.
188 See, e.g., Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983); 1 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 50, § 2.3; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN
AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 59-94 (1986); Goldstein, supra note 7; Hughes, supra
note 41; Landes & Posner, supra note 7.
89 See, e.g., Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369 (5th Cir. 1981); A.
LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW: HOWELL'S COPYRIGHT LAW REVISED AND THE 1976 ACT 29-45
(5th ed. 1979); 2 IvL NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.01[D]; Nimmer, Inroads on Copy-
right Protection, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1130-33 (1951).
"I0 See generally A. LATMAN, R. GORMAN & J. GINSBURG, supra note 22, at 8-12, 31-32;
Litman, supra note 96.
... See, e.g., 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.15 (typeface designs); id. § 2.16
(titles); Birmingham, A Critical Analysis of the Infringement of Ideas, 5 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (AS-
CAP) 107, 125 (1954) (ideas); Fleischmann, supra note 16, at 15-16 (individual recorded musical
notes); Hill, supra note 6, at 58-59 (facts); Note, Copyright Infringement: An Argument for the
Elimination of the Scnes a Faire Doctrine, 5 COMM/ENT L.J. 147 (1982).
192 See, e.g., 1 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 50, § 2.7.3; B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF
COPYRIGHT 45-46 (1967).
1 19901
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The debate over copyright in factual works furnishes one example of
this phenomenon. Copyright does not protect facts, theories about facts, or
the research that yields them, it is said, because facts are not original.' 93
The late Professor Melville Nimmer described it this way:
The "discoverer" of a scientific fact as to the nature of the physical
world, an historic fact, a contemporary news event, or any other
"fact," may not claim to be the "author" of that fact. If anyone may
claim authorship of facts, it must be the Supreme Author of us all.
The discoverer merely finds and records. He may not claim that
facts are "original" to him, although there may be originality and
hence authorship in the manner of reporting, i.e., the "expression"
of the facts. Since copyright may only be conferred upon "authors,"
it follows that quite apart from their status as "ideas," discoveries as
facts per se may not be the subject of copyright.194
Thus articulated, the argument invites its own rebuke. As Professor Jane
Ginsburg has aptly demonstrated, such an analysis rests on what Gins-
burg has dubbed the "Platonic fact precept."1 5 The fallacy of the Pla-
tonic fact precept is its tenet that facts are already there, suspended in the
ether for the hapless researcher to stumble upon."' Facts, however, do not
exist independently of the lenses through which they are viewed. Those
lenses may be theoretical, methodological, or perceptual; they may be
colored by experience or bias or may be shaped by the scope of the re-
searcher's inquiry.19 7 Researchers seeking to unearth facts must sift
through available evidence, design new avenues of inquiry, choose among
myriad conflicting indicia, and supply interpretive paradigms to structure
incoherent collections of minutia."9 Researchers can thus be said to be
composing their facts as they go along. 99 In this sense, facts are no more
M See, e.g., Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981); 1 M. NIM-
MER & D. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.1IfA]; Abramson, How Much Copying Under Copyright?
Contradictions, Paradoxes, Inconsistencies, 61 TEMP. L.Q. 133, 136 (1988); Denicola, supra note
14, at 525; Gorman, supra note 13, at 571 n.29.
'" Nimmer, The Subject Matter of Copyright Under the Act of 1976, 24 UCLA L. REV. 978,
1015-16 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
191 Ginsburg, supra note 182, at 658.
1 See id.
19 See, e.g., S. GOULD, WONDERFUL LIFE: THE BURGESS SHALE AND THE NATURE OF His-
TORY 240-77 (1989).
198 See, e.g., id. at 277-91.
189 See, e.g., Gleick, Survival of the Luckiest, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1989, § 7 (Book Review), at
1, col. 3 (review of S. GOULD, supra note 197).
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"out there" than are plots, words, or sculptural forms.200 If one discards
the Platonic fact precept, it is hard to maintain the position that facts and
theories about facts are still less original than other works of authorship
that copyright protects.20 Denial of protection must be predicated on
some alternate ground.
A proponent of the economic analysis of law might argue that because
copyright's purpose is to provide incentives for the creation of works that
are valued by society at large, copyright should protect the portions of
such works that society most values. 2 Because the most valuable contri-
bution of many factual works is the facts themselves, she might continue,
copyright ought to protect those facts. Its failure to do so arguably deters
the appropriate level of investment in fact-finding, which results in under-
production of valuable fact-based works2 03 A rival economist might retort
that non-copyright incentives already encourage a plethora of fact-based
works;204 a third might suggest that protecting facts would impose ineffi-
cient transaction costs on later authors who wish to incorporate the same
facts in their works.20 5 Each of these economic arguments has been per-
suasive to at least one court.20 6
The unruly brawl among these hypothetical economists illustrates a
problem endemic to their approach. Their models are most helpful when
empirical data is available to test their conclusions. In the absence of em-
pirical data, the result of economic analysis is dictated by the model's
202 Cf. Kakutani, Books of the, Times: A Cast of Characters on History's Indifferent Sea, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 29, 1989, at C33, col. 1 (review of J. BARNES, A HISTORY OF THE WORLD IN 10
CHAPTERS (1989)).
201 See, e.g., Hill, supra note 6, at 58-59.
20. See, e.g., National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ill.
1982); Squires, Copyright and Compilations in the Computer Era: Old Wine in New Bottles, 24
BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 18, 44-45 (1977).
200 See, e.g., Abramson, supra note 193, at 142-45; Jones, Copyright: Factual Compilations and
the Second Circuit, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 679 (1986); cf. Comment, Copyright Protection, supra
note 5, at 1023.
204 Cf Breyer, supra note 72, at 309-21 (arguing that abolishing copyright for textbooks would
not seriously affect production).
205 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 7, at 353.
206 Compare, e.g., National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89
(N.D. III. 1982), with Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145 (7th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986), and Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors
Serv., 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987). Cf Gracen v. Bradford Exch.,
698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983).
1990]
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placement of the burden of proof. Economists who begin with the assump-
tion that the copyright incentive should be no greater than necessary to
encourage authorship will conclude that the case for increased protection
is, at best, "not proven. 2 °7 Economists who start with the assertion that
any diminution of or condition on the copyright incentive should be es-
chewed until its proponents demonstrate that it will not, at the margin,
deter authorship, will similarly leave the argument unpersuaded. °B Most
arguments over the appropriate scope of copyright protection, unfortu-
nately, occur in a realm in which empirical data is not only unavailable,
but is also literally uncollectible.
The weary proponent of a vigorous public domain in general, and of a
public domain in facts in particular, turns to precedent as a justification.
We should not protect facts, she argues, because a long line of copyright
cases forbids it.2"' This argument dissolves when the directory cases are
raised.210 Indeed, even if the directory cases are dismissed as sui generis
and fundamentally misconceived, there is ample precedent deciding almost
every copyright issue in almost every conceivable direction.2 1' The myriad
variations among decisions make it possible to assemble long lines of cases
to support - or refute - any position. The copyrightability of works of
fact is no exception.21 2
This weakness in the common justifications offered in support of the
public domain takes different forms with respect to different categories of
unprotected material. When explaining courts' failure to protect sc~nes '
faire, some commentators have explained that sc~nes atfaire are indispen-
sable to the expression of common themes.213 This explanation, if accu-
rate, would pose a particular case of the idea/expression merger prob-
207 See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 72, at 321-23, 350-51; Fisher, supra note 25, at 1717-19.
200 See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 26.
209 See, e.g., Francione, supra note 71, at 537-39; Leading Cases, The Supreme Court, 1984
Tern, 99 HARv. L. REv. 120, 220-22 (1985).
20 See, e.g., National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89, 95 (N.D.
Ill. 1982).
21 See supra notes 91-103 and accompanying text.
212 See generally Shipley & Hay, supra note 138, at 129-51, and cases cited therein. Thus, all
commentators arguing for or against protection of particular works or particular rights have some case
law on their side and have been arguing not with each other but past each other.
213 See, e.g., Brinson, Copyrighted Software: Separating the Protected Expression from Unpro-
tected Ideas, A Starting Point, 29 B.C.L. REv. 803, 814 (1988); Note, Screen Displays are Proper
Subject Matter for Copyright Protection, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 757, 766.
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lem,21' denying protection to expression to avoid giving a monopoly in
unprotected ideas. Only when one examines the cases to ascertain what
sorts of sc~nes b faire have been denied protection does the explanation
dissolve. A German beer hall scene may be an expected embellishment in
a work exploring who caused the explosion of the Hindenburg dirigi-
ble,21 5 but it would be difficult to characterize it as indispensable. Nor, is it
plausible that the use of sand dollars for currency or seahorses for trans-
portation would strike a trial court as essential to express the idea of an
underwater civilization.216 The lack of protection given to scgnes a faire
seems to lie more in their triteness than their necessity.217 But why that
should be so is rarely explained. 18
Indeed, the justifications for the public domain become least satisfactory
at the most fundamental level. Why is it that copyright does not protect
'ideas? Some writers have echoed the justification for failing to protect
facts by suggesting that ideas have their origin in the public domain.21 9
Others have implied that "mere ideas" may not be worthy of the status of
private property.220 Some authors have suggested that ideas are not pro-
tected because of the strictures imposed on copyright by the first amend-
ment.22' The task of distinguishing ideas from expression in order to ex-
plain why private ownership is inappropriate for one but desirable for the
other, however, remains elusive.222
214 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
21 See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
841 (1980).
216 See Evans v. Wallace Berrie & Co., 681 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
217 Accord Ginsburg, supra note 182, at 664.
218 One might argue that the very triteness of sc~nes afaire dispels the inference that they were
copied from plaintiff's work, were it not for the fact that the doctrine is most frequently invoked to
privilege copying that has been otherwise established. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 184.
21' See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 13, at 7; see also Hughes, supra note 41, at 311-15 (explor-
ing same suggestion in the context of Lockean labor theory).
22 See, e.g., 3 M. NIMMER & D. NiMMER, supra note 2, § 13.03[A].
221 See, e.g., M. NiMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.05[C][2][b], at 2-62 to -69
(1984); Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Ex-
pression, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 289-91 (1979).
222 Indeed, most courts and commentators are satisfied to invoke Learned Hand's explanation
that there is no way to draw such a line: "Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and
nobody ever can." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 902 (1930). In a recent article, Justin Hughes suggests that a useful reformulation of the distinc-
tion between ideas and expression within the context of Lockean labor theory would assimilate the
expression portion of the distinction to the portion of a work that requires labor in its execution. See
1990]
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IV. ON ORIGINALITY
To return to first principles, let us go back to the concept of copyright
as property. The realm protected by copyright is privately owned; the un-
protected realm is the public domain. 2 "What we rely on in place of
physical borders, to divide the privately-owned from the commons and to
draw lines among the various parcels in private ownership, is copyright
law's concept of originality. 24
Copyright's threshold requirement of originality is quite modest. It re-
quires neither newness nor creativity, but merely creation without any
copying.225 The classic formulation is Judge Learned Hand's oft-quoted
aside:
Borrowed the work must indeed not be, for a plagiarist is not him-
self pro tanto an "author"; but if by some magic a man who had
never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian
Urn, he would be an "author," and, if he copyrighted it, others
might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy
Keats's. 2
The man who never knew Keats but composed an identical Ode by magic
is a mythical fellow who has not'yet troubled the courts, but he is useful
for illustrating black-letter law. Imagine a slight variation: two schoolboys
encounter Keats' Ode when their teacher reads it aloud to them in class.
Neither pays close attention. The first of the boys forgets the Ode utterly;
the second has no conscious memory of the poem, but Keats' turns of
phrase stick in his subconscious mind. Both boys grow up to be poets with
no further contact with the works of Keats, and each composes the Ode on
a Grecian Urn with no awareness that Keats has anticipated him. The
similarities of the first poet's poem to that of Keats are sheer coincidence,
and he is entitled to copyright his poem. The second poet, of course, relied
unknowingly on his subconscious memory, and he is not entitled to a
Hughes, supra note 41, at 305-14.
222 See supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
24 See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986);_1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.01[A]; W.
PATRY, supra note 51, at 23-24.
226 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936), affd, 309 U.S. 390
(1940); see, e.g., Olson, Copyright Originality, 48 Mo. L. REv. 29, 32 n.16 (1983).
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copyright because he copied his poem, albeit subconsciously, from Keats.
Examine another variation that is slightly more plausible. Each of our
young men has joined the Quality Paperback Book Club. The Club peri-
odically sends them unsolicited books; each glances at them, perhaps reads
them through, and shelves them according to his mood. One Quality Pa-
perback selection received by both is a historical novel recounting the lives
of a family of black slaves and their descendants. Both of our subjects
glance through the novel before consigning it to the bookshelf. As in the
prior example, the first fellow banishes it entirely from his mind. The
second has no conscious recollection of the book, but portions of it lurk in
his subconscious memory. Both men proceed to write and publish histori-
cal novels about enslaved families, and the author of the Quality Paper-
back Book Club selection sues both of them for copyright infringement.
The books are undeniably similar to hers in various expressive details.
Both defendants testify honestly that they were not aware of copying any-
body's prior book. According to settled authority, the second is liable for
copyright infringement; the first is not.227
By now it should be obvious that the law purports to draw lines on the
basis of "facts" that cannot be ascertained. While our two fictitious au-
thors may call for opposite legal conclusions in the world of black-letter
law, we have no way of telling them apart in the real world. The problem
is not merely that we must determine the credibility of an author's ac-
count of his intentions; rather, the problem is that the author's intentions
are irrelevant to the determination of originality versus copying.22" Copy-
right infringement requires neither bad motive nor guilty mind.
The determination of originality, however, is our benchmark for ascer-
taining the scope of an author's private property in the contents of her
works. The determination of copying is our gauge for ascertaining
whether she has trespassed on another author's rights. And only when we.
can be sure that she has never encountered the similar work of a prior
author can we confidently detect the difference between the two. Courts
27 See Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40 (S.D,N.Y. 1978); see, e.g., Bright Tunes Music
Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aflfd sub nom. ABKCO Music,
Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F.
145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
2I See, e.g., W. PATRY, supra note 51, at 203-04. The author's intentions are relevant in calcu-
lating damages, see 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1988), but not in determining liability for infringement.
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have avoided confronting this paradox through the use of procedural de-
vices and presumptions that allocate the burden of proof. But where an
ultimate fact is unknowable, the allocation of the burden of proof is
determinative.
Thus, in an infringement action, a plaintiff may prove that the defend-
ant copied her work by introducing evidence that the defendant had access
to her work and produced a work that is substantially similar.22 Accord-
ing to most authorities, the plaintiff's evidence of access and substantial
similarity shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant to disprove cop-
ying.s30 The defendant is permitted to rebut the inference by introducing
evidence that the accused work was independently created, that is, not
even subconsciously copied from the plaintiff's.2"1
If the defendant cannot disprove exposure to the plaintiffs work, how-
ever, it is difficult - to say the least - for her to demonstrate that the
similarities between the works reflect neither conscious nor unconscious
copying. 32 Lacking such evidence, the defendant might try another strat-
egy, realizing that no plaintiffs work could surmount the test of copying
to which defendants' works are subjected. If the plaintiffs work is not
itself original, then the plaintiff is not entitled to a copyright.2"3 Defend-
ant, therefore, tries to introduce evidence impeaching the originality of the
plaintiff's work by producing similar works to which plaintiff had access
22 See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983);
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947). Access is typically
defined as a "reasonable opportunity to view." See 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 2,
§ 13.02[A]. Evidence that plaintiff's work has been widely disseminated will suffice. See id. at 13-13
& n.15. The probative value of the combination of access and substantial similarity as circumstantial
evidence of copying has eroded significantly in the years since the test developed because of the in-
creasingly broad dissemination of myriad works. A reasonable opportunity to hear a copyrighted song,
for example, was a more significant event before the development of nationwide radio and television
broadcasting. In today's world, most of us have "access" to any work that has received even slight
commercial exploitation. Courts have not, however, altered their definition of access or the access-
plus-substantial-similarity equation to take account of the modem explosion in the dissemination of
works.
"' See, e.g., Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Cards Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th
Cir. 1970). See generally 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.01[B]; W. PATRY, supra
note 51, at 202-203 & n.50, and cases cited therein. But see Keeler Brass Co. v. Continental Brass
Co., 862 F.2d 1063 (4th Cir. 1988).
221 See, e.g., Herbert v. Wicklund, 744 F.2d 218 (1st Cir. 1981).
222 See 2 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 50, § 7.2.2, at 21.
222 See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
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and probably subconsciously copied." 4 Plaintiff, however, waves her cer-
tificate of copyright registration (a prerequisite to suit),235 which is prima
facie evidence of the validity of her copyright, including the originality of
her work.2"8 Since defendant cannot produce direct evidence that plaintiff
copied the prior similar works and does not receive the benefit of an ac-
cess-plus-substantial-similarity inference, the attack on the plaintiff's
copyright comes to naught.23 And defendant's own certificate of registra-
tion has no probative value as a defensive measure.238
Without questioning the value of such presumptions and procedural de-
vices as housekeeping measures to make resolution of copyright infringe-
ment suits possible, I should mention that the Copyright Office has
granted the certificate of registration for plaintiff's work without making
any determination of the work's originality.23 9 Indeed, how could it?240
"I See, e.g., Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1988); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936), affd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940); Baron v. Leo Feist, Inc., 78 F.
Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), aJJ'd, 173 F.2d 288 (1949); Ornstein v. Paramount Prods., Inc., 9 F.
Supp. 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
235 See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1988). Registration prior to suit is optional only for suitors claiming
infringement of works that originated or were first published in countries other than the United
States. See id.
236 See 3 M. NIMMER & D. NiMMER, supra note 2, §§ 12.11 [A], 13.01 [A]. The statute provides
that a certificate of registration obtained within five years of the first publication of the copyrighted
work is "prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate."
17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1988). The evidentiary weight of less prompt registration certificates is left to the
court's discretion. Id.
27 See, e.g., Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1988).
238 See 3 M. NIMMER & D. NimMER, supra note 2, § 12.11[A], at 12-80.1 n.14. My usage of
plaintiff and defendant refers to the typical case; in some cases the parties may be realigned. Thus,
courts have given evidentiary effect to certificates of registration introduced by nominal parties defend-
ant who assert copyright infringement counterclaims or defend their ownership of registered copy-
rights against the claims of former employees. See, e.g., Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F.2d 1307 (5th
Cir. 1978); Sandwiches, Inc. v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 1066 (E.D. Wis. 1987).
239 See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 156-57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5773. Indeed, under the Copyright Office's "rule of doubt," it will frequently
register copyright in a work that it believes to lack the requisite original authorship. See, e.g., Ronald
Litoff, Ltd. v. Am. Express Co., 621 F. Supp. 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). A certificate of registration
granted under the Copyright Office's rule of doubt is nonetheless prima facie evidence of the validity
of plaintiffs copyright. See, e.g., id.
2,0 But see a short story about a Copyright Office that does: S. ROaNSON, supra note 1. In the
story, the rate of copyright registration applications decreased significantly. Even so, the Copyright
Office rejected two out of every five musical works submitted for registration after a preliminary
computer search and refused to register many more musical works after diligent inquiry. Composers'
productivity plummeted and the best of them committed suicide. See id. at 16-17.
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There are two conclusions I wish to draw from the foregoing discus-
sion. The first is that the concept of originality is a poor substitute for
tangible boundaries among parcels of intellectual property because it is
inherently unascertainable. The second conclusion is more controversial:
The concept of authorship (within the meaning of the copyright law) and
the concept of infringement (also within the meaning of the copyright
law) are, for practical purposes, synonymous. I will discuss each of these
conclusions in turn.
A. The Myth of the Non-Infringing Ode
Originality, it is said, is the means that copyright uses to bound the
property that an author may claim under copyright. 4 Prominent com-
mentators discuss originality as if it were an actual legal condition that a
court could ascertain.242 Judicial decisions similarly invoke the concept of
originality. They do not, however, essay the task of determining whether
and to what extent a plaintiff's work is original.24 The procedural devices
mentioned earlier permit them to avoid that particularly slippery task.244
The corollary that copyright tolerates a plurality of similar works so
long as none of them is the product of unauthorized copying is also a
bedrock concept of the law and is equally chimerical. Learned Hand's
author of a second, identical Ode on a Grecian Urn could not successfully
rebut Keats' claim of copying with evidence of independent creation be-
241 See, e.g., Yankwich, supra note 52, at 457.
241 See, e.g., 1 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 50, § 1.2.2.3; 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra
note 2, § 2.01; W. PATRY, supra note 51, at 22-24.
"' Two notable exceptions are the decisions in Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300 (7th
Cir. 1983), and Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales & Serv., 426 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971), in which each court held plaintiff's work to be insufficiently original to
qualify for copyright at all. The only context in which courts have commonly examined the originality
of plaintiff's work is when plaintiff claims a copyright on an adaptation of an identified preexisting
work. See, e.g., L. Battlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976). Such courts have
frequently equated the required originality with the presence of a non-trivial variation from the un-
derlying work. See, e.g., id. See generally W. PATRY, supra note 51, at 24-28. Although a number of
recent cases have upheld the Register's refusal to register a work on the grounds of insufficient origi-
nal authorship, see, e.g., John Mueller & Co. v. New York Arrows Soccer Team, 802 F.2d 989 (8th
Cir. 1986); Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 693 F. Supp. 1204 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd on other grounds,
888 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989), they have rested their determination on insufficiency of authorship
rather than on absence of originality.
"" See supra notes 229-40 and accompanying text.
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cause the finder of fact routinely presumes that close similarity itself ne-
gates any evidence of independent creation.
245
This is not to suggest that every copyright claim succeeds, or even that
most succeed. It is merely to suggest that despite the esteem which the
concept of originality commands in copyright law, the concept is irrelevant
to the resolution of actual cases. Instead, courts have evolved flexible prin-
ciples that allow the finders of fact to decide infringement cases in accord
with their gut impressions.
The first of these principles is the rule that the similarity between a
plaintiff's and a defendant's works must be "substantial" to support an
inference of copying.248 Substantiality has both qualitative and quantita-
tive elements.247 The determination of substantial similarity is largely
subjective, thus permitting the finder of fact to give effect to its intuitive
judgment of the perceived equities in a case.
248
The second principle allowing resolution of actual cases on subjective
grounds is the privilege of fair use.249 Fair use is the darling of the com-
mentators, who routinely nominate it to assuage any danger of overprotec-
tion;250 it has received much more limited application by contemporary
'" E.g., Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 287 F.2d 478 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 368
U.S. 801 (1961); see 2 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 50, § 7.1, at 4-5, § 7.2, at 9, 13; see, e.g., Gaste v.
Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1988); Champion Map Corp. v. Twin Printing Co., 350 F. Supp.
1332 (E.D.N.C. 1971); Miller Studios, Inc. v. Pacific Import Co., 39 F.R.D. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Baron v. Leo Feist, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff d, 173 F.2d 288 (1949).
246 See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947).
See generally Cohen, Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial Simi-
larity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 719 (1987). There has been longstanding confusion among courts and
commentators about the relevance of substantial similarity if there is other evidence of copying in the
record. Compare, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d at 472 ("Assuming that adequate proof is made of
copying, that is not enough; for there can be 'permissible copying' which is not illicit."), with id. at
476 n.1 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("If there is actual copying, it is actionable, and there are no degrees;
what we are dealing with is the claim of similarities sufficient to justify the inference of copying.").
See also, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 905 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Estab-
lishing substantial similarity is necessary only when direct evidence of copying is unavailable.").
20 See W. PATRY, supra note 51, at 193; Cohen, supra note 246, at 741-44.
248 See Cohen, supra note 246, at 735-44.
249 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988); see Leval, Fair Use or Foul? The Nineteenth Donald C. Brace
Memorial Lecture, 36 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 167, 167 (1989) ("It is now my duty to explain
to you what we mean by fair use. And do you know what, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I can't.
No one can. We don't know.").
See, e.g., Denicola, supra note 14, at 538-40; Ginsburg, supra note 182, at 671-73; Libott,
Round the Prickly Pear: The Idea-Expression Fallacy in a Mass Communications World, 16 COPY-
HeinOnline  -- 39 Emory L. J. 1005 1990
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
courts.251 It can operate as a safety valve to rescue worthy defendants
from the, perceived injustice of an infringement judgment should the sub-
stantiality wicket fail to operate.252
In practice, these two principles are often .conflated,2"3 but they allow
the system to achieve rough justice in actual disputes. The fact that the
borders supposedly supplied by the concept of originality are entirely illu-
sory has not much hampered courts in deciding the cases before them. If
the concept of originality in copyright cases, however, is indeed as chimer-
ical as I have described, then its status as the sine qua non of copyright
254
raises intriguing questions.
What is it about the concept of originality that so inspires our confi-
dence that we ignore the fact that it fails to perform the tasks we assign to
it? In other property contexts, we might find that more disturbing. Imag-
ine, for example, that the land on which my house sits is adjacent to my
neighbor's, and that somewhere between our houses is an apple tree. Both
of us avail ourselves of its apples, but we do not know to which of us it
belongs. Should the issue arise, we believe that somewhere in the bowels
of the City Office of Deeds is a recorded document that supplies the an-
swer. Believing that to be the case, neither I nor my neighbor bothers
about actually visiting the Office of Deeds to determine who owns the
tree. If the Office of Deeds is in fact a mere myth, a sign on the door of an
RIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 30 (1968); Patterson, supra note 13.
251 See Leval, supra note 249; Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REv. 857, 896-99 (1987); Reichman, supra note 71, at 691; infra note 252.
"' Fair use excused a wide variety of uses found technically infringing during the 1960s, 1970s,
and early 1980s. See, e.g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d
1171 (5th Cir. 1980); Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124
(N.D. Ga. 1982); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In two
decisions in the mid-1980s, however, the Supreme Court sharply restricted the availability of the fair
use privilege for defendants engaged in commercial endeavors by establishing a presumption that any
commercial use of a copyrighted work was not fair. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Some
courts have allowed defendants to rebut the presumption of unfairness with a modest showing, see,
e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986), but most courts have interpreted the presumption
to block the availability of the fair use privilege by any defendant in commercial competition with
plaintiff. See, e.g., West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987). The decreased availability of the fair use privilege has increased
the pressure on the public domain.
2 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 246, at 745-46; Francione, supra note 71, at 575-79.
2 E.g., Kamar Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 391006,
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untenanted office, neither of us will discover that fact, and neither will
worry that the boundaries of our properties cannot be proved.
One day, however, some folks across the street go to court in a dispute
over which of them owns a cherry tree. Both confidently expect the evi-
dence from the Office of Deeds to resolve the litigation; instead, however,
the court decides the case by awarding the tree to the party who makes
the best cherry pie. One would expect such a ruling to cause concern; at
the least, one would expect real estate 'lawyers, realtors, and banks to be-
gin to advise their customers to take up baking with a vengeance. After a
series of similar rulings, scholars would write articles bemoaning the fail-
ure of courts to consult the Office of Deeds; courts would comment that
the system seems unjust. Landowners inept at baking and the banks that
hold their mortgages would soon insist on some alternative method for
settling title to trees. Newspapers would publish editorials exhorting the
city either to put a real Office of Deeds in the room with that sign on the
door or to replace it with something equally concrete.
In the alternate universe of copyright law, of course, no analogous com-
motion has occurred. The continued esteem for the concept of originality
as the rule for settling title to copyrights cannot stem from its pragmatic
advantages in drawing actual boundaries, so it must be attributable to its
other characteristics. Two such characteristics come to mind. The first is
that the concept of originality must have enough symbolic power to sub-
due its vaporous reality. This symbolic power is rooted in its apparent
reflection of what we would like to believe about authors and the author-
ship process. The second characteristic is that it must have a companion,
some other force in its universe that dissipates the pressure to draw relia-
ble boundaries. That companion, of course, is the public domain. The two
characteristics are not unrelated.
B. About Authorship
Let me return to the conclusion that I labeled controversial earlier:
Copyright law defines authorship and infringement so that they are indis-
tinguishable in a concrete world.2 55 An author transforms her memories,
'55 A critic might object that the paradigmatic case of copyright infringement involves intentional
piracy, and that I rely too heavily on the fact that copyright imposes'liability for unintentional copy-
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experiences, inspirations, and influences into a new work. That work in-
evitably echoes expressive elements of prior works." 6 Whether it infringes
the copyrights in the prior works depends upon the conscious and subcon-
scious processes within the author's mind. We cannot verify them; neither
can she. If this author's work lands in a copyright suit, the legal conclu-
sions that will be drawn will depend in the first instance on facts (such as
whether she is suing or being sued and whether she is holding a certificate
of registration) that have nothing to do with the nature of the authorship
process.
Why does this not seem more disturbing? Perhaps because the story
seems so hypothetical. It might describe a quandary faced by the author of
Terror in Bermuda who confesses to a glancing acquaintance with the
earlier Danger in Jamaica, but it is not going to happen to real authors.
The idea that subconscious copying occurs rarely and only at the margin
springs from a fancy that I term the "romantic model of authorship."
According to the romantic model, creative processes are magical and are,
therefore, likely to produce unique expression."' The expression is
unique because the real author is using words, musical notes, shapes, or
colors to clothe impulses that come from within her singular inner be-
ing.258 This mysterious inner being may be the repository of impressions,
experiences, and the work of other authors,2 59 but the author's individual
sensibility recasts that raw material into something distinct and
unrecognizable.
Indeed, some would deny that "recast" is an appropriate verb to use in
ing. Imposition of liability without regard to intent might merely reflect an understanding that intent
is easy to deny and difficult to prove. I confess that I find the fact that intent is not an element of
copyright infringement to be central to the copyright scheme; it is one of the most important facets of
copyright's property-like nature. I am also, I expect, much less cynical than some others about the
motives animating the behavior of most defendants in plagiarism suits. My reading of the cases per-
suades me that few defendants in this sort of suit set out to break the law or to steal someone else's
creations. They seem to succeed in doing so despite, rather than because of, their designs.
"5 See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 266.
257 See, e.g., R. CURTIS, BEYOND THE BESTSELLER: A LITERARY AGENT TAKES YOU INSIDE
THE BOOK BUSINESS 38 (1989). For the proposition that coincidental similarity of expression is so
unlikely that we can safely disregard it, see, for example, 2 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 50, § 7.2.1, at
9; Landes & Posner, supra note 7, at 344-46.
258 See, e.g., Hersey, Introduction to THE WRITER'S CRAFT 3, 7-9 (J. Hersey ed. 1974).
'5' See, e.g., Bowen, Notes on Writing a Novel, in THE WRITER'S CRAFT, supra note 258, at
[Vol. 391008
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describing the creative process. An author's artistic sensibility may be af-
fected or shaped by what she experiences, they would argue, but the
images of those experiences enter her subconscious on a one-way journey.
What the subconscious disgorges is no mere recasting of preexisting mate-
rial, but something wholly new. Anything less would be theft.260
This romantic model of authorship is implicit in much commentary
about copyright,2"' and it underlies our tolerance for the presumptions
and procedural devices that seem to make the concept of originality do the
work that the law assigns to it. Because this model establishes the distinc-
tion between creation and copying as central to our conception of author-
ship, copyrightability is identifed with originality: A work is 6opyrightable
if and to the extent that it is original, or created, rather than copied. We
know that real authors create rather than copy, so we are comfortable
with a presumption that the works they register for copyright are original.
We believe in the idea that expression is created from thin air 62 and the
correlative notion that the universe of creative expression is infinite, so we
are ready to conclude that similarity of expression must reflect plagia-
rism. 6 ' And we worry not a bit that our conclusions are unverifiable be-
cause they reflect our intuitive beliefs about reality.
265 See, e.g., T. MALLON, STOLEN WORDS: FORAYS INTO THE ORIGINS AND RAVAGES OF PLA-
GIARISM (1989).
261 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 590, 605-26 (1987); Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1561-
62; Ladd, supra note 4; Bowker Memorial Lecture by Barbara Ringer, The Demonology of Copy-
right, in New York City (Oct. 24, 1974), reprinted in MODERN COPYRIGHT FUNDAMENTALS: KEY
WRITINGS ON TECHNOLOGICAL AND OTHER ISSUES 24 (B. Weil & B. Polansky 1985).
26' This intuitive endorsement of the concept of originality may be in part responsible for the
unease over copyright in works that are interpretations of preexisting works. See, e.g., Gracen v.
Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983). Conductors' interpretations of the musical works
that their orchestras perform surely reflect authorship. Actors' portrayals of the roles that they act,
directors' productions of the scripts that they mount, and violinists' renditions of the sonatas that they
play cannot be distinguished convincingly from the other sorts of authorship that secure copyright
protection. See, e.g., Note, Copyright in the Stage Direction of a Broadway Musical, 8 COLUM.-VLA
J. ART & L. 309 (1982). The copyrightability of such authorship nonetheless remains controversial.
See id.; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, TECHNOLOGICAL ALTERATIONS TO MOTION PICTURES AND
OTHER AUDIOVISUAL WORKS 161 (1989). The statute does grant copyright to sound recordings of
preexisting musical works, see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (1988), but gives them fewer and more condi-
tional rights than it accords to other works of authorship. See 17 U.S.C. § 114. Because it is difficult
to isolate the contribution of an author interpreting a preexisting work from the expression already
embodied in or dictated by that work, copyright protection for conductors, actors, directors, or violin-
ists may seem inappropriate to some adherents of the romantic model of authorship.
263 See, e.g., T. MALLON, supra note 260, at 111, 120.
1990] 1009
HeinOnline  -- 39 Emory L. J. 1009 1990
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
Let me offer, however, a competing metaphor for the authorship pro-
cess, drawn from the case of Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts,
Inc.264 In discussing the copyrightability of mezzotint engravings that re-
produced public domain paintings, Judge Jerome Frank observed: "A
copyist's bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a shock caused by a
clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable variations. Having
hit upon such a variation unintentionally, the 'author' may adopt it as his
and copyright it."2" 5 This formulation depicts authorship as a more mod-
est achievement. Of course, Judge Frank was addressing the specific situa-
tion of the author who imperfectly reproduces a preexisting work, but this
image of the individual whose apparent creativity is the product of imper-
fect eyesight, flawed execution, or unrelated circumstances can serve as a
metaphor for authorship in general. The metaphor suggests that transfor-
mation is the essence of the authorship process. Some of this transforma-
tion is purposeful; some of it is inadvertent; much of it is the product of an
author's peculiar astigmatic vision.
An author, be she writer, composer, or sculptor, seeks to communicate
her own expression of the world. Her views of the world are shaped by
her experiences, by the other works of authorship she has absorbed
(which are also her experiences), and by the interaction between the two.
Her brain has not organized all of this into neat, separable piles entitled
"things that happened to me," "things I read once," and "things I thought
up in a vacuum" to enable her to draw the elements of her works of
authorship from the correct pile. She did not, after all, experience them so
discretely. A snatch of a tune she heard was infected by the shape of the
place where she was sitting when she heard it; her sense of a pattern she
saw was colored by that day's weather; a conversation she overheard was
tainted by the book that she was reading at the time. Her memories of the
song, the pattern, the conversation, filtered through her experience, may
in fact seem quite unlike the objects she believes they represent. The
counterpoint between a sound from one memory and a smell from another
may express something quite different from what either seems to say
alone. But when the author mines the raw material for her next work,
significant portions of it will be the stuff of the outside world mediated by
her experience. It is unsurprising, then, that parts of her work will echo
26 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
265Id. at 105 (footnotes omitted).
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the works of others.2 6
To the author engaged in finding concrete form for immaterial im-
pulses, each phrase, tone, or configuration of expression may seem new at
the moment it takes shape. The author will often not recognize the ante-
cedents that she has absorbed in the past and recasts and recombines as
she works. Such amnesia about the sources of one's diction is a blessing
that enables the work to proceed without the paralysis that would follow
from examining each accretion for echoes of prior works.
My characterization of authorship as a combination of absorption,
astigmatism, and amnesia is not intended to diminish its merit. Indeed,
my position is that this mixture is precisely the process that yields the
works of authorship we wish to encourage through the copyright law. The
strong form of this argument is that all authorship is the product of astig-
matic repackaging of others' expression, but this strong form is unneces-
sary for our purposes. We can rely instead on a milder and hardly contro-
versial variation: All works of authorship, even the most creative, include
some elements adapted from raw material that the author first encoun-
tered in someone else's works.287 If this description is accurate, it implies
that the romantic model of authorship, taken seriously, would do grave
disservice to the authors it seeks to describe.
Were we to take the legal concept of originality seriously, we would
need to ensure that authors' copyrights encompassed only those aspects of
their works that were actually original. We could not draw the boundaries
of an author's property in the contents of her work until we had dissected
"I Compare G. LIGHTFOOT, If You Could Read My Mind, on IF You COULD READ MY
MIND (Reprise 1970) with M. MASSER & L. CREED, The Greatest Love of All, on WHITNEY Hous-
TON (Arista 1985). See dlso Chow, Locus Looks at Books: Reviews by Dan Chow, Locus, Sept. 1989,
at 27, 27-28 (reviewing D. SIMMONS, HYPERION (1989) as a repackaging of Ingmar Bergman's
screenplay The Seventh Seal); Miller, Locus Looks at Books: Reviews by Faren Miller, Locus, Sept.
1989, at 15, 64 (calling same book a "literary farrago" with elements of "Chaucer, Keats, Gibson,
Niven (and more)."); Whitmore, Locus Looks at Books: Reviews by Tom Whitmore, Locus, Sept.
1989, at 25 (reviewing same book as "a strange mix of John Keats, Geoffrey Chaucer, apocalyptic
religion, time travel and interstellar political intrigue."); Kakutani, Books of the Times: World War
II Los Angeles, as a Boy Sees It, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1989, at C21, col. I (review of R. DEMARINIS,
THE YEAR OF THE ZINC PENNY (1989), noting "echoes throughout the narrative of the movies 'Radio
Days', 'Hope and Glory' and 'Empire of the Sun' ").
2" See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 7, at 218; Jaszi, When Works Collide: Derivative Motion
Pictures, Underlying Rights, and the Public Interest, 28 UCLA L. REv. 715, 729-33 (1981); Landes
& Posner, supra note 7, at 332.
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her authorship process to pare the. preexisting elements from her astig-
matic recasting of them. I argued earlier that such a dissection would be
impossible in practical terms.2"" If it were possible, I am confident that
authors would not welcome it.2"9
Absent such dissection, however; we risk granting broad and overlap-
ping property rights in the subject matter of copyright.270 If each author's
claim to own everything embodied in her work were enforceable in court,
almost every work could be enjoined by the owner of the copyright in
another.27 '1 That prospect'is at least as repellent as the spectre of merciless
dissection raised above.
To avoid choosing between the two, we rely on the public domain. Be-
cause we have a public domain, we can permit authors to avoid the harsh
light of a genuine search for provenance, and thus maintain the illusion
that their works are indeed their own creations. We can tolerate the grant
of overbroad and overlapping deeds through the expedient assumption
that each author took her raw material from the commons, rather than
from the property named in prior deeds.
V. EXPLORING THE COMMONS
The historical development of the public domain began as a straightfor-
ward problem in statutory construction and proceeded through ad hoc ar-
ticulation in series of cases decided under successive statutes. 27 2 Tradi-
tional explanations of the public domain have failed to justify the cases on
principled grounds. When the public domain is viewed as a commons that
rescues us from our choice to grant fuzzy and overlapping property rights
in unascertainable material, however, some of the apparent contradictions
in lines of cases become more transparent.
268 See supra notes 228-29, 255-67, and accompanying texts.
269 See infra notes 293-94 and accompanying text.
270 See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 71, at 683-87.
... Accord Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIo ST.
L.J. 517, 556 & n.232 (1990). Landes and Posner pose this problem differently, as imposing licensing
and other transaction costs on authors seeking to obtain permission to copy prior works. See Landes &
Posner, supra note 7, at 332. Their formulation requires that such authors be aware, or at least
capable of discovering, from whom they are copying. I argue that in most cases they are not.
... See supra notes 75-186 and accompanying text.
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One traditional justification for the public domain is that the public
.domain is the public's price for the grant of a copyright. The public is
said to grant the copyright as an incentive to persuade the author to create
and publish original works that will enrich the public domain.2 3 Thus,
copyright endures only for limited times. Some aspects of copyrighted
works are thought to be so important to the public that society demands
unrestricted access to them immediately, without waiting for the copyright
to expire. Ideas and works of the federal government are said to possess
these qualities.2
This reasoning explains the systems cases well. Systems are important
- so important that the public is reluctant to grant a fuzzy property right
in systems to anyone claiming an interest. Instead, we have the patent
statute under which a claimant can obtain a firmer property right, but
only after making a significantly more specific showing of the basis for her
claim.275 In the absence of such a showing, the public claims even original
systems as its own.
Neologisms furnish another straightforward example. Coined words are
not copyrightable27 6 despite the fact that some of them are demonstrably
original. 2 " I am unaware of any who would dispute that neologisms be-
long in the public domain, but one could not plausibly argue that they
originated there. Granting copyright protection to an invented word would
seem at first blush to be utterly harmless, for it would remove nothing
from the commons that was there before the word's author created it. In-
dividual words, however, tend to seep into the language. We hear them,
absorb them, and use them; we think in them whether they are old, famil-
iar words or new, familiar words. Language is sufficiently crucial that we
insist on unrestricted access to words, even new words. We do have a
trademark system for establishing property rights in words, but again we
... See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Patterson & Joyce,
supra note 71, at 790-91; sources cited supra note 13.
2"4 See, e.g., 1 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 50, §§ 2.3.1.1, 2.5.2; 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER,
supra note 2, § 2.03[D]; W. PATRY, supra note 51, at 30-35, 51-55; Denicola, supra note 14, at 523-
24.
2175 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
2.. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1989).
17 See G. BRANDRETH, THE JoY OF LEX: How TO HAVE FUN WITH 860,341,500 WORDS 9
(1980) (aerosol; automation); W. SAFIRE, ON LANGUAGE 9 (2d ed. 1981) (deplane); id. at 282 (up-
tight); id. at 289 (pseudoevent). Consider also "palimony," "yuppie," "significant other," and "Ms."
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require a stronger and more specific showing to support the claimant's
title. 78 The trademark statute permits a word to be withdrawn from the
public domain only if, and only to the extent that, it has acquired a pro-
prietary meaning.
The current dispute over copyright protection for computer software
user interfaces17' raises analogous issues. User interfaces are themselves
languages - the languages people use to operate their computers.280 Be-
cause user interfaces have the attributes of languages, users learn them as
if they were languages.28 To the extent that individual commands or
keystrokes 2 2 in popular user interfaces are understood by users as indi-
vidual words, they must belong to the public domain simply because they
are elements of language.283 The public's demand for unrestricted use of
language will not tolerate private ownership of words or word-analogues
under the rubric of copyright.
This quid pro quo justification, however, cannot explain the cases deny-
ing protection to sc~nes ?zfaire.28 4 Moreover, it cannot account for the line
of cases granting protection to facts in directories and catalogs while deny-
ing protection to facts in other sorts of works. Indeed, under traditional
justifications for the public domain, the directory case law makes no sense.
If we decline to protect information because the law assimilates facts to
ideas and systems,285 then the cases should rigorously dissect the informa-
tion in directories and catalogs from the form in which the information is
expressed. If protection is denied to information because facts are not orig-
inal, 86 then works conveying information in unoriginal form (alphabeti-
cal, for example) should receive little or no protection under the copyright
law.
28 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991 (N.D.
Cal. 1989). See generally Menell, supra note 181; Samuelson & Glushko, supra note 180.
280 Indeed, in common parlance, user interfaces are the means by which users "communicate
with" their computers.
281 See, e.g., Seymour, Who Owns the Standards?, PC MAG., May 26, 1987, at 174.
282 E.g., pressing the function key "FT" to exit the program.
s See Menell, supra note 181, at 1098-1102.
2 See supra notes 128-33, 213-18, and accompanying texts.
285 See, e.g., 1 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 50, § 2.14; Denicola, supra note 14, at 525-26.
288 See, e.g., 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.11[A]; Denicola, supra note 14, at
525; Gorman, supra note 13, at 571 n.29.
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Had the cases denying copyright protection for facts begun from a firm
consensus that facts belonged to the public domain, they would likely have
developed along precisely those lines. Most of the cases defining the public
domain, however, involved courts carving out exceptions to authors'
claimed property rights in order to alleviate pressure exerted by the
breadth of plaintiffs' claims. That pressure, which strained the integrity of
copyright law, was imposed not by plaintiffs' greed but by the inherent
limits of the concept of originality. To illustrate how originality generates
this pressure and how the courts' resort to the public domain helps to
dissipate it, I propose to look again at the public domain case law from
the viewpoints of potential defendants, potential plaintiffs, and the system
of copyright law as a whole.
A. Protecting Potential Defendants
The dangers of overbroad and overlapping property rights in works of
authorship seem most obvious when considering the plight of inadvertent
infringers. Ideas, systems, themes, and plots are not easily traced. It is
difficult to ascertain the source of an ideA and impossible to prove its prov-
enance in any meaningful sense. A court cannot unzip an author's head in
order to trace the genealogy of her motifs; indeed, the author herself usu-
ally cannot pin down the root of her inspiration. Giving an author a copy-
right in something that is a basic building block of her art thus risks deny-
ing that basic building block to all other authors who come into even
fleeting contact with the first author's work. It is our inability to trace or
verify the lineage of ideas that makes it essential that they be preserved in
the public domain.
Facts seem more verifiable. To the extent that they are drawn from
preexisting sources, the sources may be checked. The question "Where is
that fact from?" is a question that often seems to have an answer. None-
theless, protecting facts can pose a separate problem. We often learn the
facts we encounter and incorporate them into our views of the world in
which we live. Once they have taken residence, they will color the things
we believe that we see, and we are helpless to pry them out again in order
to sit down and create works of authorship. A rule requiring authors ef-
fectively to forget the facts learned from other authors would be destruc-
tive and impossible to enforce.
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Courts nonetheless imposed just such a rule in the directory cases. The
current prevailing rule requires the author of a second directory first to go
out and duplicate the original research and only then to consult the pre-
existing directory for verification.287 This is a wasteful rule, certainly, but
perhaps it is a comprehensible one. Courts may have responded to an
intuitive sense that it would be unlikely for an author to make inadvertent
use of directory listings because we do not normally learn the contents of
directories. When courts in the directory cases, then, protected the facts in
plaintiffs' directories, they did not prohibit defendants from consulting the
same preexisting sources that plaintiffs had consulted.288 As a result,
plaintiff's copyright did not remove facts from the public domain; it sim-
ply prohibited a single, albeit more efficient, route to unearthing them. 8 '
From the viewpoint of analytical order, it seems indefensible to protect
the facts in directories with a zealousness unparalleled in other cases of
factual works. If, however, one is in the business of defining exceptions in
cases in which asserted property rights would cripple the enterprise of
authorship, the distinctions that courts drew have some intuitive appeal. If
the chief threat of defining the borders of property in works of authorship
is that it will penalize defendants for inadvertent or inevitable use of com-
mon building blocks, then the directory cases seem to pose no danger.
Thus, the fact cases can be reconciled if we understand the principle of
seepage: Some aspects of works of authorship are easily absorbed, and
once we have absorbed them, we are likely to make them our own and
lose sight of their origins. Ideas, information, short phrases, simple plots,
themes, stock scenes, and utilitarian solutions to concrete problems all
287 See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co. Inc., 905 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990); United
Tel. Co. v. Johnson Publishing Co., 671 F. Supp. 1514 (W.D. Mo. 1987), affd, 855 F.2d 604 (8th
Cir. 1988); National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. I1. 1982);
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Bedco of Minn., Inc., 501 F. Supp. 299 (D. Minn. 1980); cf. Rockford
Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1985) (maps), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1061 (1986).
288 Plaintiffs recovered for copyright infringement only when they succeeded in proving, typically
by showing common errors, that defendants had copied their directories from plaintiffs rather than
independently collecting their facts. See, e.g., List Publishing Co. v. Keller, 30 F. 772 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1887). See generally Lurvey, supra note 137.
28 See Denicola, supra note 14, at 541. The distinction is, of course, a largely illusory one in the
real world. Requiring a second author to obtain facts from independent sources before consulting
plaintiff's work is functionally indistinguishable froa granting copyright protection to the facts in
plaintiff's work.
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share this characteristic. It makes them difficult to trace. That difficulty
should make us leery of granting exclusive property rights in such things
without requiring the claimant to offer significant proof in support of her
claim of ownership. We have, howeyer, elected to adopt a system that
confers property rights without requiring any concrete proof of owner-
ship, because we value the property rights and recognize that in many
cases such proof would be impossible to obtain. To keep such a system
from defeating its ends, we leave the elements subject to such absorption
free from private claims, even in cases in which we could determine their
initial source. But we do not concern ourselves with this problem in situa-
tions in which the works in question seem unlikely to be absorbed. In
such cases, there seems to be no imperative reason for separating pro-
tectible from unprotectible elements.
Despite its intuitive appeal, however, the picture of the public domain
that emerges from the distinctions among the fact cases is too limited. It
emphasizes defendants' motives, supporting a vision of the public domain
as a commons that exists chiefly for the benefit Of the defendant copying
unintentionally and in good faith. The danger of such a view is that it
tempts us to abandon the commons whenever proof of copying seems less
circumstantial. But here it is useful to recall that many of the cases defin-
ing the borders of the public domain involve no such ambiguous situation.
Indeed, if we look only at the interest of potential defendants in avoid-
ing liability for copying that they would be powerless to prevent, then the
film cases make no sense at all. In some of the film cases, defendants had
provisionally admitted copying for the purpose of a motion to dismiss.2 90
In others, the evidence of intentional copying was compelling."' Yet
courts carved out a commons that immediately benefited parties who had
apparently made deliberate use of others' works. The solution to this ap-
parent paradox is the realization that the public domain is not merely a
haven for well-meaning potential defendants. It benefits potential plain-
tiffs as well.
290 See, e.g., Caruthers v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 906, 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1937);
Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), affd, 100 F.2d 533 (2d
Cir. 1938).
291 See, e.g., Ornstein v. Paramount Prods., Inc., 9 F. Supp. 896, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Witwer
v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 46 F.2d 792, 794 (S.D. Cal. 1930), rev'd, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.), cert. dis-
missed, 296 U.S. 669 (1933); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 34 F.2d 145, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1929),
affd, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1930).
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B. Protecting Potential Plaintiffs
The commons provides significant advantages for parties plaintiff. Be-
cause we can rely on the commons, we do not require plaintiffs to prove
the originality of their works.292 We could take another approach, of
course: We could insist that plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating
their works' originality before enforcing their claims. As we currently de-
fine originality, however, most plaintiffs would be unable to muster the
evidence required, and few would recover.
The principle of seepage is not limited to such material as will inevita-
bly seep from the works of potential plaintiffs into the works of potential
defendants. It is equally likely that such material seeped into the works of
the potential plaintiffs themselves.2 3 To the extent that such elements
seeped into plaintiffs" works from other prior works, any property rights
in these elements will overlap the claims of others significantly. To resolve
the overlap, it would be necessary to require plaintiffs to prove the bases
for their claims. If we permit them to do so, we invite the introduction of
evidence purporting to prove - or disprove - actual originality. Even
raising the possibility that such elements could be protected if plaintiff
could only prove their provenance would effectively impose that test on all
such cases. A plaintiff required to prove originality of all aspects of her
work in order to recover for copyright infringement would be well advised
to decline to bring suit.
The absence of a public domain would make copyright meaningless for
most plaintiffs if we were to require them to bear the burden of proof on
the originality of their works, at least as long as proving originality re-
mained impossible as a practical matter. A second implication is more
subtle: Even if proving originality were not impossible, it would be ex-
ceedingly unpleasant. It would take the magic away. Authors could no
longer safely give free rein to their subconscious minds, and their muses
would need to be available for deposition. Many would discover that cre-
ations they believed were their own were, at least in the eyes of the law,
mere copies of the works of others.
:92 See supra notes 267-71 and accompanying text.
'3 Others have argued that facts, ideas, or sc~nes a faire are by their nature unoriginal. See
sources cited supra notes 192-94. My point is a little different: It is not that that these elements are
necessarily unoriginal, but rather that they may be.
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Such a system would probably not endure for long. Forced to face the
flaws of a system based on actual proof of originality, we would undoubt-
edly abandon the concept. But, to the extent that the idea of originality
embodies things that we would like to believe, the presence of the public
domain has made it possible for us to do so.
The essence of my argument is this: Originality is a conceit, but we like
it. To the extent that we are tempted to forget that originality is a conceit,
it can be a dangerous principle on which to base a system of property.
Most authors would agree in the abstract that the raw material that au-
thors use in their work must be left free for all authors to use. Individual
authors can nonetheless dispute the applicability of this abstract principle
to a situation in which they see something that they think of as their own
in a later author's work. We could force each copyright owner to demon-
strate her right to claim such aspects of her work by requiring her to
prove their originality, but we would have to accept that she would often
be unable to do so in any meaningful way. We could instead tolerate a
world in which all authors must seek permission from each of their prede-
cessors, but few new works of authorship would be likely to appear in
such a system. 294 Instead, we rely on a commons, and we draw the bound-
aries of that commons by recalling the fact that the concept of originality,
we purport to rely on is a mere apparition that we cannot afford to test.
C. Rescuing the System
There is a third set of interests threatened by the phantasm of original-
ity: the copyright system's interests in preserving its own integrity. The
problem of overlapping claims, alluded to above, invites gridlock in the
courts as parties request, judicial resolution of insoluble disputes. This set
of interests, I think, best explains the recent impulses of some courts to
expand the borders of the commons.295 To illustrate this problem, I offer
a final parable.
Imagine the familiar plot of a novel for children. You remember this
book: Our heroine (hero) is an unpopular, bookish sort, small for her age
and, typically, bullied by her more popular classmates. 'One day in the
.. See, e.g., Yen, supra note 271, at 556.
"" See cases cited supra note 184.
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public library she finds a book she has never seen before: worn, plump,
and red. (For some reason, the book always seems to be red.) It is a magic
book. Indeed, it seems to be written especially for our heroine (hero). She
reads the book, certain at first that it is some sort of joke, but then discov-
ers that the magic in the book really works. It takes her to strange alter-
nate universes, where she meets alien creatures and ultimately performs
brave deeds that save at least a small part of the world.2" 8 The class bul-
lies no longer trouble her.
Imagine as well a contemporary author of books for children who has
just finished a manuscript along these lines. Her lawyer remarks in pass-
ing that she recalls reading something of this ilk to her son. (The son was
entranced.) Indeed, now that she thinks of it, she has a vague recollection
of enjoying a similar book borrowed from the library some thirty years
ago. Our author becomes concerned.
A dedicated paralegal spends two days in the municipal public library
and turns up twelve versions of this plot. In each, the book is red. The
author, who cannot recall having read any of them, but is unable to rule
out the possibility, asks her lawyer to explore the question whether any of
these twelve authors would object to publication of her book. When con-
tacted, the first of them assures the lawyer that he has no objection, as
long as the novel's hero is a young fellow, with a large dog, getting over
his parent's recent divorce. The second author is similarly obliging, on the
condition that the book's central character be a young Hispanic woman
with a part-time job in a diner. The third demands a Native American,
the fourth a Jew, the fifth a WASP.
At this point, our author and her lawyer would like to file an action to
determine with whose conditions she must comply. Imagine now that they
file an interpleader suit, depositing the plot of the novel with the court
and joining the dozen prior authors as defendants. Each of the dozen files
a counterclaim to quiet title in the plot; five other authors of similar sto-
ries seek to intervene.
297
29 See, e.g., D. DUANE, SO YOU WANT TO BE A WIZARD (1983); E. EAGER, SEVEN-DAY
MAGIC (1962). But cf. M. ENDE, THE NEVERENDING STORY (1983) (book is bound in copper silk);
W. ROBERTS, THE MAGIC BOOK (1986) (book is blue).
297 For other variations on the magic book story with books in different hues, see, for example,
L.F. BAUM, GLINDA OF Oz (1920); R. GRAVES, THE BIG GREEN BOOK (1962); E. NESBIT, The
Book of Beasts, in THE LAST OF THE DRAGONS AND SOME OTHERS (1975); P. O'SHEA, THE
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The court before which this suit is brought faces a quandary. There is
no rule of decision that can resolve the issues in dispute. Theoretically,
each of the authors before the court may be entitled to claim ownership of
the plot on the ground that she originated it; it is, after all, the sort of plot
that any bookish child with a taste for fantasy might have thought up on
her own. On the other hand, any or all of the authors may have con-
sciously or subconsciously copied the plot from some prior source. The
question cannot be determined directly, and the presumptions and proce-
dural devices that usually make this determination unnecessary are of no
assistance here, because the court has no basis on which to apportion the
benefits and burdens of the procedural devices among the parties before it.
When we are confronted with an insoluble problem in overlapping
deeds, pragmatic concerns may outweigh doctrinal ones: It ceases to mat-
ter why this plot is claimed by so many authors; the important thing is
that it is. The court could dismiss the case on procedural grounds - the
plot of a novel is'after all an unfamiliar res. This rescues the court from
the spectre of having to make any decision, but it leaves the children's
book industry in disarray. Next week, some composers are sure to show
up with a dispute over chord progressions. The court could instead award
exclusive rights in the plot to one particular author - perhaps the one
who bakes the best cherry pie. This solution would seriously inconve-
nience the other authors, who would presumably incur liability for their
use of the plot unless they could disprove access to that author's book. The
court could avoid that particular difficulty by awarding the plot to all of
the authors before it. This answer would, of course, hinder the authors of
the future, but perhaps the world has enough literature about magic books
already. Finally, the court could decide that without some principle on
which to base a decision, the plot must belong to the commons. This deci-
sion relieves the parties of having to produce'inconclusive evidence of orig-
inality, relieves the court of having to reach a decision with no basis for
doing so, and relieves the law of having a predicament posed by overlap-
ping deeds.
My parable is about plots, of course, but it is also a metaphor for
sc~nes a faire. Sc~nes b faire are common; they are the property shared
HOUNDS OF THE MORRIGAN (1985). See also D. DUANE, HIGH WIZARDRY (1990) (text of magic
book shows up on heroine's portable computer).
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among the overlapping deeds. Some sc~nes b faire are common because
they are trite; some become trite because they are common; for others it is
hard to figure out why they appear so frequently.298 There is no particu-
lar reason why a magic book should be red; if the book is always red or
even often red, however, that is a sckne a faire. When we grant deeds
without doing title searches, we risk significant overlap. We can often
fashion rules to permit us to decide between two or. three competing
claimants, if not necessarily on strictly doctrinal grounds.299 At some
point, however, the frequency of overlapping claims to something in par-
ticular will itself become the problem. Assigning that something to the
commons is the copyright law's most practical defense.
This leads me to an observation about some recent cases. Some courts
have been increasing their resort to the sc~nes a faire doctrine during the
last decade 00 These courts have been responding to a real and troubling
trend. If access to a prior work is the basis for presuming that similarities
represent actionable copying,"' 1 then one would expect a marked increase
in everybody's access to everything to carry with it increasing inferences of
infringement. The copyright law has defined access as "reasonable oppor-
tunity to view" since before the development of modern methods of mass
dissemination.302 Disproving access is, in most cases, no longer possible.303
It is not surprising, then, that the pressure of overlapping claims to com-
mon material has increased and that the courts have felt it necessary to
rely on the public domain in ever more sorts of cases. We may be ap-
proaching an era in which familar solutions to the chimera of originality
become insufficent; there may soon come a day when we have to give the
notion up.
298 Thus, four theatrical motion pictures based on nearly identical age-switching premises were
released in the U.S. during the 1987-88 season. Compare Big (Fox 1988) with 18 Again (New World
1988), Vice Versa (Columbia 1988), and Like Father, Like Son (TriStar 1987). Producers and critics
attributed the similarities among the films to "something in the air." See, e.g., Maslin, Today's Alter
Has a Smaller Ego, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1988, § 2 (Arts & Leisure), at 29, col. 1; Sterritt, A Plot
Gimmick That May be Ready to Retire, Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 29, 1988, at 33, col. 1; Kempley,
The Vices of "Versa," Wash. Post, Mar. 11, 1988, at D7, col. 1.
... See supra notes 246-52 and accompanying text.
0 See supra note 184 and accompanying 'text.
20H See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
0 See supra note 229.
o See, e.g., T. MALLON, supra note 260, at 221.
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CONCLUSION
Copyright law purports to define the nature and scope of the property
rights that it confers by relying on the concept of originality. In fact, origi-
nality is an apparition; it does not, and cannot, provide a basis for decid-
ing copyright cases. The vision of authorship on which it is based - por-
traying authorship as ineffable creation from nothing - is both flawed
and misleading, disserving the authors it seeks to extol. If we took that
vision seriously, we could not grant authors copyright rights without first
dissecting their creative process to pare elements adapted from the works
of others from the later authors' recasting of them. That dissection would
be both impossible and unwelcome. If we eschewed that vision but none-
theless adhered unswervingly to the concept of originality, we would
oblige each author to solicit the permission of her predecessors. In such a
world, most works of authorship would find themselves enjoined by the
owners of other copyrights.
The public domain rescues us from this dilemma. It permits us to con-
tinue to exalt originality without acknowledging that our claims to take
originality seriously are mostly pretense. It furnishes a crucial device to an
otherwise unworkable system by reserving the raw material of authorship
to the commons, thus leaving that raw material available for other authors
to use. The public domain thus permits the law of copyright to avoid a
confrontation with the poverty of some of the assumptions on which it is
based.
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